Tapping on the Shoulder

 “To every man there comes a time in his lifetime, that special moment when he is figuratively tapped on the shoulder and offered that special chance to do a very special thing, unique to him and fitted to his talents. What a tragedy if that moment finds him unprepared or unqualified to do the work which could have been his finest hour.”

Winston Churchill

Now that Russia has its President-elect, it’s time to shift attention to the composition of Vladimir Putin’s new Cabinet, beginning, naturally, with the post of prime-minister.

At first glance, this issue has been settled long time ago: when announcing his decision to run for presidency for the third time — at the congress of the United Russia party on September 24, 2011 — Putin promised this position to the current President Dmitry Medvedev.  (“…based on broad popular support, Dmitry Anatolievich will…lead the Government of the Russian Federation to continue his work on modernization.”)  And just a few days ago, at a meeting with foreign media, Putin confirmed his original decision: “Mr. Medvedev will be offered the position of prime minister.”

“Offered” is a key word here: according to the Russian Constitution, within two weeks after inauguration, the new president submits the candidacy for prime minister to the Duma; the Duma then has one week to approve or reject the president’s choice.

In ordinary times – with Putin’s approval ratings around 70% and United Russia having the constitutional majority in the Duma — Putin’s nomination and parliamentary approval of a candidate would mean the same thing.  But ours are not ordinary times: a pre-election rating bump can’t hide Putin’s significantly reduced public support, and United Russia enjoys only a 26-seat majority in the Duma.  Besides, it might be important that within the United Russia parliamentary faction, there is a block of about 60 deputies who ran in the Duma elections on the All-Russia People’s Front list.  They got their Duma seats only after Putin’s intervention, after United Russia’s officials tried to distribute their mandates to the party members.  These 60 deputies are loyal personally to Putin and are likely to disobey the orders of the leadership of the faction if told so by the president.  Relations between United Russia and the Front have been lukewarm at best; the Front’s informal leader, Putin’s election campaign manager, Stanislav Govorukhin repeatedly criticized Medvedev for not campaigning for Putin enough.

If for whatever reason Putin decides to renege on his promise to Medvedev without publicly breaking his word, all he has to do is to send a subtle signal to the Duma.  Deputy from three opposition parties will happily vote against Medvedev, and it will take only 30 “rogue” Frontmen to reject Medvedev’s candidacy.  (Incidentally, if the Duma rejects presidential nominee(s) three times, president dissolves the Duma and calls for new elections.  Putin is unlikely to resort to that, but it’s still worth remembering that he has multiple tools in his toolbox.)

Besides keeping his word, a Putin trademark, having Medvedev as prime minister would present President Putin with a number of benefits.  First, with his modernization vocabulary, Medvedev will bring a reformist flavor to the new Cabinet.  Second, this move will allow Putin to counterbalance the conservative wing of the elites that has been gaining weight as of late – and simultaneously mollify the “liberals” upset with Medvedev not being allowed to run for the second term.  Third, given Medvedev’s positive image around the world and Putin’s own disdain for things international, the president may charge his prime minister with certain foreign policy chores.  In this regards, a recent Forbes article speculated – based on unidentified government sources — that responsibilities of future prime minister may be expanded to include representing Russia at world summits, including, possibly, even G8.

On the other hand, selecting Medvedev will come at a cost.  Mikhail Dmitriev, the president of the Center of Strategic Development, points out that Medvedev is inefficient manager and is widely disliked by the state bureaucrats.  More importantly, argues Dmitriev, Medvedev is lacking any real public support.  This would be irrelevant, or even desirable, at the era of “technical” prime ministers like Mikhail Fradkov and Victor Zubkov.  But now, with Putin’s own popularity sliding and a cloud of illegitimacy hovering over the Duma, the regime needs someone with a high level of trust among the public and the elites alike – and Medvedev just doesn’t fit the bill.

Another blow to the idea of Medvedev as prime minister came from unexpected source: from Medvedev’s confidant Igor Yurgens.  In a recent interview, Yurgens insisted that, given the economic situation in the country, Medvedev’s hopes to pursue his modernization agenda as head of government were unrealistic.  Yurgens further suggested and that if Medvedev aspired to advance his political career – including potential presidential run in six years – the Putin administration was a wrong place to be.

So far, Medvedev has shown absolutely no signs of doubts that the plan articulated by the “tandem” almost six months ago will be implemented as stated.  In a sense, he has no other option.  Medvedev’s point of no return passed sometime last summer, when he could either insist on running for the second term or threaten to leave the “tandem” at all.  In all likelihood, Medvedev would have lost this battle to his mentor, but he could at least comfort himself with the notion that in Russia, being a “victim” often promises future political opportunities (remember Yeltsin).  Now, it’s too late.  Having lost a chance to become a political figure in his own right, Medvedev made himself a hostage of a word, Putin’s word.  Or, paraphrasing Churchill, the Fate was tapping Medvedev on the shoulder, but he didn’t notice because he was listening to Putin.

About Eugene Ivanov

Eugene Ivanov is a PMI-certified Innovation Management Consultant who helps organizations increase the efficiency of their internal and external innovation programs.
This entry was posted in Uncategorized and tagged , , , , , , , , , , , , , , . Bookmark the permalink.

10 Responses to Tapping on the Shoulder

  1. Alex says:

    I feel that the “fate” was tapping Putin’s shoulder .and surprisingly, asking something he no doubt was able to do … .but he chose not to notice…

    Do you really believe that Medvedev has any political future? Well, if only he does something extraordinary .. like something he has never done before.. That is – something he most likely, cannot do. Otherwise, making him a Prime Minister will only add to the growing discontent with Putin. I would recommend Navalnyi instead – a win-win-win solution no matter how he will perform.
    ( 1st”win” = good performance, 2nd “win”=bad performance and the 3rd “win”= “you see how democratic I am”). Although, if I were Navalnyi and offered the job – I would have refused 🙂


    • Alex says:

      oh forgot the 4th “win” – an opportunity to remove opponents – without dirtying his hands- while Navalnyi attempts to implement his anti-corruption proposals..

      • Eugene says:


        Personally, I don’t think that Medvedev has a political future. As I said, he was unable to become a “muzhik” and he chose not to become a “victim.” As a result, he became a loser. Apparently, he believes that he can stay in government long enough to create a political base of his own. Good luck.

        I don’t share the common obsession with Navalny. He’s good at what he’s doing — fighting corruption — but his other qualities are questionable at best. Speaking seriously, there are people around Putin who can do the PM job better than Medvedev. If I were Putin, I’d think Khloponin.


        • Alex says:

          funny enough, but I cannot think of any real (“professional”, useful for other people) talent needed to become a Prime Minister (or ,for that matter – a President). Even IQ. All I can think of are “qualities” of the character which are usually not regraded as virtues among decent people. Thus any candidate will do “professionally”, the selection shall be for their qualities (or on normal scale – the lack thereof) and or “usefulness” for someone who matters. 🙂


          • Eugene says:


            Your comment is so loaded that I’m simply afraid to even start addressing it 🙂 But let me scratch the surface by pointing out that Putin has had 3 PMs. Kasyanov was “real” PM, and Putin had problems with him. Fradkov and Zubkov were “technical” PMs, and everything was fine.

            What about Medvedev? He obviously doesn’t want to be technical PM. Will Putin allow him to become real? That’s the question, as a classic would put it.


  2. Alexander Mercouris says:

    My own personal view is that having declared the tandem switch Putin has no realistic option but to go through with it and to appoint Medvedev Prime Minister. I had not heard before that Medvedev is a poor manager but sadly I rather suspected it. Regardless given the way the decision was made Putin is stuck with it and with him.

    • Eugene says:

      Dear Alexander,

      I agree with you that back in September, offering Medvedev the PM-ship was the only “smooth” way to dismantle the tandem. Yet, this decision was made in different circumstances — essentially, in a different country. I respect Putin for holding his words, but I’d put the interests of the country first.

      That said, until Putin announced the priorities of his government — and I don’t count his multiple newspaper articles as such — it’s almost pointless to discuss what kind of PM he needs. (Perhaps, I should have started my piece with this :)).


  3. marknesop says:

    I think rather than being a poor manager, Medvedev does not understand the nature of leadership, and that high ideals will not survive the cut and thrust of reality. In no venue is it so true as of politics that nice guys finish last. I liked Medvedev, and believed in his sincerity to try and do his best for Russia, although a little maturity would not have come amiss.

    I agree, however, that the wording of Putin’s “promise” – to wit, that the Prime Ministerial office will be “offered” to Medvedev – foreshadows a desire for someone else in the position. Perhaps Medvedev will grasp the subtlety and decline. But for me, the real hint that Medvedev was not the ideal was Putin’s suggestion that there will be less liberalizing reforms this term. That was pretty much Medvedev’s stock in trade.

    • Eugene says:

      Hi Mark,

      I’m with you on Medvedev’s lack of leadership. The fact (or at least insinuation) that he’s a poor manager too came as somewhat a surprise to me. After all, the guy has been Chairman of Gazprom, deputy head of PA, vice premier…

      Speaking of stocks, Medvedev is buying Putin’s stock. A risky transaction, if you ask me. But, perhaps, Medvedev knows something I don’t 🙂


  4. Augis Barkov says:

    It might be Kudrin.

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out /  Change )

Google photo

You are commenting using your Google account. Log Out /  Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out /  Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out /  Change )

Connecting to %s