Social networking

Posted on April 5, 2012 by

(This piece originally appeared on Russia Beyond the Headlines)

U.S. Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul is likely to accomplish something none of his predecessors ever dreamed of: he is becoming a household name.  His ascension to the status of celebrity of sorts might be surprising; yet, it’s hardly accidental.

Attention to McFaul’s persona was first drawn last year when U.S. President Barack Obama surprisingly tapped him, a diplomatic novice, to replace seasoned career diplomat John Beyrle as the envoy to Moscow.  By nominating McFaul, the White House was sending a message that the Obama administration was going to pay more attention to the issue of human rights in Russia.  McFaul, one of the leading U.S. experts in “democracy promotion,” was supposed to personify this policy shift.  Characteristically, even sworn enemies of the administration’s Russia policy hailed McFaul’s nomination.

McFaul didn’t disappoint his supporters.  His “democracy promotion” credentials went to work immediately after his arrival in Moscow: In his second day on the job, McFaul invited a group of Russian opposition politicians and civil society activists to the ambassador’s residence, Spaso House.  The meeting was extensively covered by the Russian media.  It appears that hosting social events will become a prominent venue for McFaul to keep himself visible.  Last week, he threw a party featuring a folk band that was flown to Moscow from McFaul’s native Montana.  Images of the ambassador dancing with his wife were promptly made available to the electronic and print media.

In addition, McFaul is working hard to establish his presence in social networks.  His first post (in Russian) on LiveJournal, a popular blogging portal, appeared on the day of his arrival in Russia.  McFaul also opened a Twitter account where he writes both in English and Russian.

At the same time, the ambassador doesn’t forget what he promised during his Senate confirmation hearings: to meet regularly with the Russian opposition.  One such meeting got him in trouble.  Last Thursday, having arrived for a chat with the human rights activist Lev Ponomarev, McFaul was confronted by a group of young people with a camera who introduced themselves as reporters from the state-sponsored NTV station.  According to McFaul, for several minutes, the “crew” had prevented his from entering into the building.

Later, McFaul let his frustration into the open on Twitter.  He complained that the NTV reporters stalked him everywhere he went to and wondered how they knew his schedule.  McFaul even suggested that NTV employees read his emails and listen to his phone.

If someone hoped to treat this story as a benign street encounter, this hope was squashed by the U.S. State Department’s formal complaints to the Russian Foreign Ministry alleging that McFaul’s “security and safety” had been compromised.  Incidentally, this is not for the first time that Russian youngsters – with TV cameras or without – have harassed foreign diplomats, and it’s hard to believe that the Russian authorities weren’t aware of the accidents or couldn’t do anything about it.

Naturally, the NTV officials dismissed McFaul’s charges of eavesdropping and instead attributed their knowledge of the ambassador’s whereabouts to the extensive network of “informants.”  The Russian Public Chamber threw its support behind NTV, arguing that there was nothing wrong with journalists’ desire to “learn more about a public figure – an ambassador, a patriarch or politician.”  A patriarch?  Can anyone imagine an NTV crew constantly following Patriarch Kirill?

McFaul knows Russia well and is aware that “promoting democracy” there is a safe business for a foreign diplomat – as opposed to some other countries where his colleagues can leave the embassy compound only with an escort of armored vehicles.  Yet, having spent the bulk of his professional life in the academic environment, McFaul didn’t learn what other celebrities around the world know all too well: increased public profile comes at the price of reduced privacy and additional security challenges.  It’s now time for McFaul to learn this lesson.

At the same time, one can’t deny McFaul’s remarkable ability to use his current job position to advance future career aspirations.  Once can be sure that for the rest of his life – and certainly during his next Senate confirmation hearings – he’ll carry the NTV encounter as a badge of honor.

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Discovering each other, one question at a time

Posted on April 2, 2012 by

After having lived in the United States for almost 20 years, I’m used to answering questions about Russia.

Questions, of course, vary but the most popular overall has been: Why do Russians not celebrate Thanksgiving?  My explanation that history of Russia doesn’t include interactions between the Pilgrims and the Indians doesn’t sound too convincing.  People seem to question my knowledge of the past and, perhaps, even my Russianness.  So one day I tried something different.  Why do Russians not celebrate Thanksgiving?  Because they can’t produce enough turkeys for every Russian family.  My interlocutor nodded approvingly at my thoughtfulness.

Some questions are so puzzling that I’m not even sure that I understand them correctly.  A young lady from Kansas asked me if Russians buried their dead.  Excuse me, reacted I incredulously, but of course, how else?  Apparently sensing that something was wrong, she murmured “Never mind” and changed the subject.

Yet my absolutely favorite question – asked only once but I still remember it – is this: Was your last czar (Nicolas II) also president?

Boldly considering myself not only bilingual, but truly bicultural, I take it as my civic duty to answer questions about America every time I visit Russia.  Back in 2000s, the most popular question my friends were asking me was: How much does it cost in America to buy a…?  Usually, it was a house.  I used to explain patiently that the price of real estate varied widely between different U.S. states, cities and even locations in the same city and that the extent of this variation could be as huge as the difference between the price for a one-room apartment in a provincial Russian town and the one for a mansion on Rublevka.

Then, I remember this old lady, a friend of my Mom, whose knowledge of America tracked back to the glorious times of the Cold War.  Having apparently decided to ask me an “educated” question, she soberly inquired: Well, how do ordinary Americans live these days?  (The miserable life of “ordinary Americans” was a regular concern raised by the Soviet media.)  I didn’t want to lie, but I didn’t want to disappoint her, either.  So I said: They are still struggling.  By her reaction, I knew this was something she wanted to hear.

Times change, and as my Russian friends freely travel around the world, they don’t need me anymore to acquire knowledge of foreign countries.  These days, the most frequent question I hear in Russia is: Did you see…?  The title of the newest Hollywood blockbuster follows.  Embarrassed, I defend myself by babbling that I don’t like going to the movies and usually wait until Hollywood masterpieces appear on Netflix.  Ouch.

Curiously, over all these years, I’ve never faced a hostile question.  No one ever asked me why Russia (America) wanted to destroy America (Russia).  True, I’m not a man who can give an order to destroy another country – and my interlocutors knew that.  However, I prefer to believe that the lack of such questions reflects the sense of quiet respect Americans and Russians hold towards each other.

Incidentally, measurements of public sentiments in both countries support this notion.  In Russia, 50% of those surveyed in a recent poll expressed positive attitude towards the U.S.; only 35% held negative views.  In the U.S., similar 50% of Americans held favorable views of Russia; this number was unsurprisingly higher among younger Americans.  So when politicians in both countries make stupid statements – that Russia is the United States’ “number one geopolitical foe” or that “the United States was keenly interested in destabilizing Russia” – they should know: they speak for themselves rather than for their constituents.

The way forward, as I see it, is to keep discovering each other, one question at a time.  So when you spot my unmistakably Russian accent, do shoot me a question about Russia.  Any question.  The only question I’ll refuse to answer is: This next president of yours.  Will he also be czar?

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Open-mike diplomacy

Posted on March 29, 2012 by

(This piece originally appeared on Russia Beyond the Headlines)

The Seoul Nuclear Security Symposium provided a set stage for the last summit between Russian president Dmitry Medvedev and his U.S. counterpart Barack Obama.  Speaking for the media after a 90-minute meeting, both leaders used the opportunity to showcase positive developments in U.S.-Russia relations — the New START treaty and Russia’s accession to the WTO, in particular — that have taken place over the past three years under their stewardship.  Both spoke about the urgent need to jumpstart economic and trade relations between the two countries.  Both paid tribute to the good personal chemistry that helped them keep the “reset” in U.S.-Russia relations on course.

The problems that divide Moscow and Washington have been mentioned too.  One of the most acute is a disagreement over approaches to ending violence in Syria; another, more chronic, is the lack of a shared vision on the architecture of European missile defense.  Choosing his words very carefully, Medvedev acknowledged that at the moment, Russia and the U.S. very taking dramatically different positions; yet, he argued that a room for a compromise still existed.  Obama concurred by saying that time was right for experts from both countries to begin detailed discussions on the technical aspects of this complex issue.

But any substantive discussion in the the Medvedev-Obama rendezvous was overshadowed by a gaffe that the media pounced on: chatting without interpreters between the conclusion of their one-on-one and the beginning of the media briefing, the presidents did not realize that the microphones were already on.  Continuing the conversation and referring apparently to Russian President-elect Vladimir Putin, Obama was heard as saying to Medvedev: “On all these issues, particularly on missile defense, this can be solved but it’s important for him to give me space.”  “I understand.  I understand your message about space.  Space for you,” Medvedev responded.  “This is my last election,” went on Obama, “After my election I have more flexibility.” “I understand,” again replied Medvedev, “I will pass this information to Vladimir.”

Gaffes at such a high level are bound to have domestic repercussions.  Medvedev got away lightly: his critics in Russia took advantage of the “pass this information to Vladimir” line to highlight the president’s lame-duck status.  But Obama found himself in hot water: the Republicans accused him of readiness to make concessions to Russia that could undermine the strength of U.S. missile defense.  House Speaker John Boehner (R-OH) said he would be curious to hear what the president meant by “flexibility.”

The leading GOP presidential candidate Mitt Romney immediately jumped into the ring and described Obama’s comments “an alarming and troubling development;” he went further, calling Russia the United States’ “number one geopolitical foe.”  Romney’s joy over Obama’s gaffe is understandable: he had a terrible week — with his own adviser comparing him to an Etch A Sketch toy.  Plagued with perennial accusations of being too “flexible” on issues, Romney was all too happy to hang onto something he has never wavered over: his opposition to Obama’s Russia policy, beginning with the New START treaty.

If Obama has learned anything during his 3+ years as president, it is how to conduct damage control.  Speaking to reporters the next day after his “open-mike” meeting with Medvedev, Obama made fun of his gaffe and then, turning serious, proceeded with describing missile defense as “extraordinary complex [and] very technical” issue.  Given this complexity, the president argued, it would be virtually impossible to win broad consensus in Congress for any major security agreement with Russia in an election year.  Deputy national security adviser Ben Rhodes in a statement re-iterated the boss’ message: “since 2012 is an election year in both countries…it is clearly not a year in which we are going to achieve a breakthrough,” Rhodes said.

There is no doubt that Romney as the Republican presidential nominee will attempt to make Obama’s Russia policy an election issue in November.  Expect images of the president cuddling with Medvedev in Seoul to be repeatedly played in TV ads produced by the Romney campaign.  It is however unlikely that the “flexibility” gaffe will have any serious negative impact on Obama’s re-election prospects.  Romney’s overly aggressive anti-Russian stance, including his opposition to the New START treaty, is not widely shared even among the Republicans — and is definitely unpopular with independent voters.  Besides, by recklessly calling Russia the United States’ “number one geopolitical foe,” Romney made it more difficult for himself to criticize the Obama administration’s policies toward China, Iran, and North Korea.

It was almost heartbreaking to watch how Medvedev and some Russian officials rushed to defend Obama against his GOP rival.  Relax, folks!  Obama is an adult and can stand for himself.  If Moscow really wants to see him re-elected, it could help by immediately stopping the ridiculous anti-American campaign that by now, with the Duma and presidential campaigns concluded, has completely outlived its usefulness.

Let’s give Obama a break.  Or, in his own words, space.

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S. 1039

Posted on March 25, 2012 by

“To impose sanctions on persons responsible for the detention, abuse, or death of Sergei Magnitsky, for the conspiracy to defraud the Russian Federation of taxes on corporate profits through fraudulent transactions and lawsuits against Hermitage, and for other gross violations of human rights in the Russian Federation, and for other purposes.”

The preamble to the “Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act of 2011”

“…and for other purposes.”

As Russia is going to officially join the WTO this summer, discussion is underway in U.S. Congress on what to do with the Jackson-Vanik amendment (JVA), the notorious relic of the Cold War that keeps depriving Russia of the permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) status as a punishment for restricting Jewish emigration in the 70s.  The Obama administration wants the amendment to be lifted arguing that with Russia in the WTO, not granting it the PNTR status will hurt interests of American businesses.  While agreeing with the White House that the amendment should go, the Republicans in Congress refuse to just repeal the amendment; they insist that something else should be put in place to hold Moscow accountable for what they habitually call “human-right abuses.”

As a replacement, the so-called Magnitsky bill is proposed, a piece of legislation bearing the name of Sergei Magnitsky, a corruption whistleblower who died in Russian police custody in 2009.  The bill introduced by Sen. Ben Cardin (D-MD) last May would impose a U.S. visa ban on Russian officials implicated in the Magnitsky death; it would also freeze their financial assets in the U.S.  The administration, however, considers the bill “redundant” on the ground that last summer, the State Department already composed a list of 60 individuals related to the Magnitsky case whose entry in the U.S. would be prohibited.  Instead, the White House called for the creation of a “civil society fund” (worth of $50 million) that would underwrite promoting democracy in Russia.

“Redundancy” is a euphemistic explanation of why the Obama administration doesn’t want the Magnitsky bill being adopted.  The real reason is that S. 1039 is simply a bad piece of legislation.  Last summer, the administration provided an extensive “administration comments” highlighting multiple shortcomings of the bill.  The most salient points were as follows:

  1. Previous U.S. visa bans and asset freezes have targeted the perpetrators of genocide or mass killings; this bill is different because it involves persons implicated in the death of one individual.  At the same time, the threshold for placing names to the “Magnitsky list” is ambiguous and would set a bad precedent for how the United States deals with human rights cases around the world;
  2. The legislation contains a broad catch-all provisions that could potentially apply to any individual who is responsible for “other gross violations of human rights;”
  3. The legislation imposes harsh quasi-judicial requirements on the State Department that are outside of its normal mandate; the DOS is simply not equipped to meet them.  In particular, they include hearings that would have to be conducted by visa officers to determine whether the allegations made against an applicant are credible;
  4. Section 212(a)(3)(E) of the Immigration and Nationality Act already bars admission to the United States to aliens who have engaged in torture and extrajudicial killing.  The bill’s visa restrictions are therefore unnecessary;
  5. The bill is overly burdensome in that it requires an audit and report to the Treasury Secretary by all U.S. financial institutions regarding assets belonging to sanctioned persons;
  6. The bill does not include a provision for appeal — a normal part of due process — for a sanctioned person who is the subject of an asset freeze.

Finally, it was said that “an initial inter-agency review of about 60 targets proposed in connection with the bill shows that there is insufficient information to meet the high evidentiary standard required to establish the responsibility of specific individuals for the harm alleged in the bill relating to Magnitsky…which is a serious issue in particular with respect to economic sanctions that are vulnerable to legal challenge.”  (Emphasis is mine – EI)

In other words, while claiming that he cares about improving rule of law in the Russian Federation, Sen. Cardin had created a bill whose provisions disrespect the law of his own country, the United States of America.

This obviously doesn’t concern numerous supporters of S. 1039 around the world – including members of the “liberal opposition” in Russia – many of whom are unlikely to have even read the bill.  They need S. 1039 exactly for the same purpose they cherished the archaic JVA: to put pressure on Russia, to have a “legal” ground for non-stop meddling in its domestic affairs.  Remember: “and for other purposes?”

President Obama is smart enough to understand that creating of a “civil society fund” won’t be sufficient to overcome the congressional resistance to repealing the JVA; some “replacement” to the amendment seems to be inevitable to strike a deal.  Besides, while the administration is sincerely troubled with the implementation of S. 1039 in its current form, it doesn’t appear to have any ideological problem with the bill in general.  Appearing before Senate Foreign Relation Committee on Feb. 28, 2012, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called again for lifting the JVA, but stressed the “need to send a clear, unmistakable message to Russia that we care deeply about rule of law in Russia.”  Addressing directly Sen. Cardin, Clinton offered him to work together with the White House to achieve both goals, to which Cardin replied: “I look forward to working with you.  I do think we can do both.”

The simplest interpretation of this exchange would be that in the coming months, the White House will be pressing Cardin to modify the bill to make it palatable to the administration.  With a new version of S. 1039 in hand, President Obama will try again to force the Republicans in Congress to repeal the JVA.  If they refuse, Obama will portrait them as hostile to the interests of American business – and make it a November election issue.

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Return on Investment

Posted on March 23, 2012 by

(This piece originally appeared on Russia Beyond the Headlines)

If one is to trust common wisdom and the Republican presidential candidate Ron Paul, providing financial aid to foreign countries is a shameful waste of U.S. taxpayers dollars.  However, a recent story in the New York Times suggests that common wisdom and, believe it or not, American politicians could be wrong.

According to the story, in 1989, Congress approved legislation allowing the investment of U.S. federal funds in the former communist countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia — to help them develop market economies.  Far from being wasted, these investments turned to be quite successful, having generated a lofty $2.3 billion in returns.  Part of the proceeds was returned to the Treasury, but some of the money has been stuck in Congress for years.  Now, the Obama administration wants to redirect a $50 million generated by the U.S.-Russia Investment Fund into a “civil society fund” that would underwrite promoting democracy in Russia.

The timing of the announcement is hardly coincidental.  The Obama administration has finally gotten serious about repealing the Jackson-Vanik amendment, the notorious relic of the Cold War that still deprives Russia of the permanent normal trade relations status as a punishment for restricting Jewish emigration in the 70s.  The effort has been met with a stiff resistance by the Republicans on the Hill.  While agreeing with the White House that the amendment should go – as keeping it on the books now, that Russia is joining the WTO, will hurt interests of American companies – Republicans argue that something else should be put in place to hold Moscow accountable for what they habitually call “human-right abuses.”

A natural successor to the amendment would be the so-called Magnitsky bill, a piece of legislation bearing the name of Sergey Magnitsky, a whistleblower who died in Russian police custody in 2009.  The bill introduced by Sen. Ben Cardin (D-Md.) last year would impose a U.S. visa ban on Russian officials implicated in the Magnitsky death and would also freeze their financial assets in the U.S.  The administration, however, considers the bill “redundant” on the ground that last summer, the State Department already composed a list of 60 individuals related to the Magnitsky case whose entry in the U.S. was to be prohibited.

Trying to prevent the adoption of the Magnitsky bill – which, as the White House believes, will have negative impact on the future of U.S.-Russia relations – the administration is now using every opportunity to demonstrate to its critics that it takes seriously the issue of human rights in Russia.  Assistant Secretary of State Phil Gordon recently boasted that since 2009, the United States has spent “more than $200 million seeking to promote democracy, human rights and civil society” in Russia.  Although Mr. Gordon didn’t explain what kind of return, if any, the U.S. had gained from this investment, the very creation of the “civil society fund” with an additional $50 million indicates that the Obama administration considers this investment strategy worthy of pursuing.

It remains to be seen whether the new “democracy promotion” investment fund will succeed in mollifying the critics of Obama’s Russia policy.  Yet, it’s already clear that by making this decision, the administration showed its inability to correctly evaluate the situation on the ground.  The anti-American sentiments in Russia that have risen sharply in recent months show no signs of abating.  In large part, these sentiments are fueled by constantly repeated insinuations that the protest actions organized by the Russian opposition are funded by the U.S. State Department.  The U.S. could hardly have done more to help the Kremlin propaganda machine as to announce an additional “democracy promotion” money flowing to Russia!

U.S. ambassador to Moscow Michael McFaul, whose multiple responsibilities apparently include informing President Obama on what’s going on in the country, made an attempt at damage control:  in a post to his Twitter account, McFaul wrote: “The U.S. govt does not & will not fund Russian political parties, movements, candidates, or politicians, only exchanges & non-partisan NGOs.”  McFaul’s calculation seems to have been that, when re-tweeted by his 20,000+ followers, his message will be well spread all across Russia making any official explanations redundant.

In 2009-2011, Presidents Obama and Medvedev have worked hard to establish trust between the two countries.  It’s sad to watch how this precious capital is now being wasted in both countries to achieve short-term political goals.  With this trend continuing, we may well see the policy of the “reset” going bankrupt.

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The Phoenix: the rise and fall and rise of Dmitry Rogozin

Posted on March 17, 2012 by

On Jan. 21, 2005, something unprecedented happened in the Russian State Duma: five deputies from the Rodina faction, headed by its leader, Dmitry Rogozin, entered Rogozin’s spacious office in the Duma building – where five air-mattresses were waiting for them – and went on hunger strike.  The strikers demanded that President Vladimir Putin immediately suspended the implementation of the law on monetization of social benefits (a.k.a. Bill 122) and fired the Minister of Social Welfare Mikhail Zurabov.  An installed camera was broadcasting the event live on the Rodina party website.

The hunger strike that lasted 11 days and resulted in hospitalization of one of its participants became a high point in the controversy over the notorious Bill 122.  It also became the beginning of the end of the Rodina party and – as many believed back then – was to mark the end of Rogozin’s then-promising political career.

Rodina was created in September 2003 as an electoral bloc combining three “social-patriotic” parties: the Party of Russian Regions (with Rogozin at the helm), the People’s Will Party, and the United Socialist Party of Russia.  Its creation – just three months before the December Duma elections – was universally viewed as the Kremlin’s attempt to weaken the Communist Party (KPRF).  Rogozin boasted to his supporters that Putin considered Rodina his “personal project.”

All initial indications showed that the “project” was a success.  The 9% of the votes polled by Rodina in December was suspiciously close to the 12% lost by KPRF as compared to its 1999 results.  Rogozin became the leader of the 37-member Duma faction; his Rodina party began acquiring new members and showed strong results in the regional elections.  Rogozin’s personal popularity took off, too, with the state media providing him with favorable coverage.  Rumors started to circulate that the Kremlin wanted Rodina to completely squeeze the Communist out of the left flank and eventually become the main opposition party to United Russia.

Typical for a Russian politician, Rogozin’s ideological views were difficult to define.  Half-Zhirinovsky/half-Zyuganov, he successfully alternated national-patriotic banners of the former with the social justice rhetoric of the latter.  Where Rogozin did stand out was his virulent criticism of the oligarchs whose “shackles” he wanted the country to get rid of.  (Which didn’t prevent Rogozin from accepting campaign contributions from the banker Alexander Lebedev.)  In addition, for some time, Rogozin had managed to mix his personal loyalty to Putin with opposition to Putin’s government, which, in Rogozin’s view, was full of “oligarch’s agents.”  Rogozin publicly called on Putin to launch a fight against the oligarchs and promised that in this fight, Putin can use Rodina as his personal “spetsnaz.”

The two sides of Rogozin – loyalty to Putin and opposition to the government – finally collided in January 2005, when the Duma began debating the implementation of the law on monetization of benefits, which just took effect and caused widespread public protests.  Rogozin accused the economic bloc of the Cabinet – Zurabov along with the Minister of Finance Alexei Kudrin and Economic Minister German Gref – in betraying Putin.  Rogozin insisted that sacking the government – or, at the very least, Zurabov — was the only way to save Putin’s reputation.

Soon, it became clear that the Duma, dominated by United Russia, was unwilling to make any move against the Cabinet.  Having realized that his goals can’t be achieved by parliamentary means, Rogozin apparently concluded that something more dramatic should be tried.

Later, Rogozin described the hunger strike as a “well-thought action.”  In reality, he had miscalculated just about everything.  Instead of becoming a center of attention, Rogozin found himself in a state of virtual informational blockade.  The Duma leadership ignored him.  Worst of all, the struggle of Putin’s “spetsnaz” attracted absolutely no interest – much less support – of Putin himself.  All of sudden, Rogozin was trapped.

A decent way out came in the form of resolution by the Rodina Duma faction “directing” Rogozin to end the strike.  Rogozin promptly obliged and proclaimed the strike a success.  However, reflecting his changing attitude towards Putin, he announced that Rodina was moving into opposition not only to the Cabinet, but to the executive branch “as a whole.”

A “new” Rodina obviously needed new friends, and their choice was somewhat surprising.  The first was KPRF, the very party Rodina was supposed to fight with.  The Communists supported Rogozin during the strike, and grateful Rogozin began talking about a broad left-patriotic, Rodina-KPRF, coalition for the 2007 Duma elections.  Another friend in the fight against the oligarchs came in the shape of the jailed Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who, in his widely publicized article, “The Left Turn,” predicted Rodina’s imminent ascension to power.  Many observers interpreted this passage as Khodorkovsky’s overture to Rogozin.  Returning the favor, Rogozin’s lieutenant Andrei Savelyev suggested that Khodorkovsky should run for president.

In the meantime, clouds began gathering over Rogozin and his party.  In July 2005, the Duma allowed the registration of the second Rodina faction composed of members of Sergey Baburin’s People’s Will Party; this shrank Rogozin’s faction by a third.  Adding insult to injury, Rogozin was stripped of his position as Duma vice-speaker (the post went to Baburin).  Rogozin naturally accused the presidential administration in masterminding the split, and he obviously had a point: having used Rodina to harass the Communists in 2003, the Kremlin was now using Baburin’s party to pressure Rodina, which the Kremlin increasingly considered as being “out of control.”

Rogozin had certainly realized that he was fighting for his political life.  Reflecting new realities, his Rodina completely abandoned its anti-oligarch rhetoric and adopted instead extremely nationalistic platform that many in Russia called xenophobic or even fascist.  Having made illegal immigration a centerpiece of its election campaign for the Moscow City Duma in the fall of 2005, Rodina released of a TV ad “Let’s clean the city of garbage!” This sealed its fate: following a barrage of criticism that the ad incited ethnic hatred, Rodina was banned from the elections.

In March 2006, Rogozin stepped down as the party leader, and when on October 28, 2006, Rodina merged with two other parties (the Russian Party of Life and the Russian Pensioners’ Party) to create a new political entity, Just Russia, Rogozin terminated his party membership.

Rogozin’s post-Rodina life initially followed the pattern characteristic for any disgraced politician: he was sent abroad.  In January of 2008, he was appointed a Russian ambassador to NATO in Brussels, and for the next three and half years, little has been heard from or about him.  Rogozin surfaced in summer of 2011 as Russia’s chief spokesperson on the hot topic of European missile defense.  In July 2011, he traveled to the United States and met with the officials at the White House, State Department and Congress.  At the conclusion of one of the meetings, Rogozin — demonstrating his newly acquired diplomatic skills — called two Republican senators “monsters of the Cold War.”

In the fall of 2011, it became clear that Rogozin was returning to Russian politics.  He resumed his activity as the leader of the Congress of Russian Communities, a “national-patriotic” organization he established in 1992.  The Congress threw its support behind the All-Russia People’s Front created to promote Putin’s presidential run.  “My choice is Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin,” Rogozin told to a meeting of supporters.  (“Vladimir Vladimirovich, your personal spetsnaz is waiting for your orders.”)

In December, Rogozin was unexpectedly appointed deputy prime minister in charge of military industrial complex, a move that is said to have been personally lobbied by Putin.  Some publications now predict that in the new Putin’s cabinet, headed by Medvedev, Rogozin will also become Minister of Defense.

Regardless of his near future, Rogozin is definitely a man to watch long-term.

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Thou Shalt Love Thy Enemy

Posted on March 14, 2012 by

(This piece originally appeared on Russia Beyond the Headlines)

Only a few month ago, a consensus among Russia watchers was that the return of Vladimir Putin to the Russian presidency will have little impact on U.S.-Russia relations. Andrew Kuchins of the Center for Strategic and International Studies predicted back in September 2011: “The possible election of Putin as the President of Russia will not signify a fundamental change in the direction of U.S.-Russia relations.”  But at the beginning of March, Kuchins concluded that the “reset” in U.S.-Russia relations was over and that “Washington should prepare for a far more contentious relationship with Moscow.”  Quite a change, isn’t it?  What went wrong?

Arguably, there are enough contentious issues between Washington and Moscow, starting with European missile defense.  Russia genuinely considers the future deployment of anti-missile defense systems in Eastern Europe as a serious threat to its security, and the Kremlin sees no reason to hide its concerns.  Speaking at a meeting in December 2011, Russia’s then-ambassador to NATO Dmitry Rogozin warned that the country was facing a danger of becoming “easy victim” at the hands of some (unnamed by Rogozin) hostile forces.  Rogozin’s words shouldn’t be taken lightly: shortly after delivering this speech, he was appointed deputy prime minister in charge of military-industrial complex; rumors in Moscow were that this appointment was lobbied personally by Putin.

Then Putin himself invoked the image of the enemy at Russia’s door by accusing U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in inciting the street protests that followed the Dec. 4 Duma elections.  Subsequently, in one of his seven election manifestos published in the Russian press, Putin made it clear that he considered the United States an unfriendly (“destructive”) force guilty of “democracy promotion” at gunpoint.

In Russia, subordinates always try to outdo the boss.  Taking Putin’s words as a nod, the Prosecutor General Yury Chaika alleged — without presenting any specific evidence — that the December protests had been financed from the abroad; Vladimir Popovkin, head of Russian space agency Roscosmos, attributed the failure of the unmanned Phobos-Ground probe to the action of American radar; Chairman of the Duma Committee on Foreign Affairs Alexei Pushkov suggested that the United States was keenly  interested in destabilizing Russia and would make every effort to weaken its government; and high-ranked United Russia party’s official Andrei Isaev went as far as to warn his compatriots that in 2012, they will face a “new battle for the freedom and independence of Russia against attempts by the United State of America to establish control over [the] country.”

The rising anti-American rhetoric in Moscow was closely watched in Washington.  But it wasn’t until the vote on UN Security Council resolution on Syria that the simmering tension broke into the open.  The U.S., along with 13 other members of the Council, voted in favor of the resolution calling for the Syrian president Bashar al-Assad to step down.  Russia and China blocked the resolution on the ground that it would invite Libya-style military intervention .  Shortly thereafter, the shots flew over the Atlantic: Clinton called the Russian veto “despicable;” Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov characterized this reaction as “hysterical.”

Curiously, many people in Russia seemed to sincerely believe that the escalating anti-Americanism was no more than a verbal excess of the ongoing presidential campaign.  Naturally, they expected that once the election campaign was over, U.S.-Russia relations would rapidly return “to normal.”  So when on March 6, Lavrov finally spoke on the phone with Clinton — “in a call that officials said had a ‘get back to business’ tone,” according to the New York Times, the sense in Moscow was that was that.

Well, it wasn’t.  In the heat of the presidential campaign, folks in Moscow have apparently forgotten that the United States was going into a presidential election campaign of its own and that critics of President Obama were looking for any opportunity to attack him.  For months, the president’s opponents have been painstakingly collecting every available evidence of his ”failed” Russia policy: the lack of progress on missile defense and Iran nuclear program; Russia’s support for Syria; harsh treatment by Russian state media of Michael McFaul, the new U.S. Ambassador to Russia; the parliamentary elections in Russia that many in the U.S. consider undemocratic.  All this logically came together after the March 4 presidential vote against the background of the “aggressive” anti-American statements.

In the coming months, Moscow will be watching how anti-Russian rhetoric is unraveling in the U.S., and it’ll hardly like what it sees.  The leading Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney makes no secret that the “reset” is really over if he’s elected president.  Anti-Russian sentiments are widespread in Congress, obstructing the Obama Administration’s efforts to repeal the notorious Jackson-Vanik amendment.  Some hawks have gone as far as to call for Putin not to be invited to the NATO-Russia summit in Chicago in May; they also question whether Obama should hold a bilateral meeting with Putin during the G8 summit at Camp David.

It remains to be seen how Moscow will react to this “symmetric response.”  Putin’s third presidency has undoubtedly damaged Russia’s reputation in the world and also complicated political situation at home.  With the number of friends dwindling, the Kremlin may well decide to keep a good trusted enemy, whose image at the door – ready to break in – could help solidify whatever is left of the proverbial “Putin’s majority.”  In the Kremlin’s calculation, the cost of policy of the “reset” – which continuation demands certain level of trust in the U.S. partner – might have already outweighed its benefits.  One can be sure that if Putin did cry during his victory speech at the Manezh Square, he cried not over the death of the “reset.”

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