In a phone conversation with the summit host, U.S. President Barack Obama, Putin attributed this decision to the need to finalize cabinet appointments in the new Russian government. Had such an explanation come, say, from François Hollande, it would have sounded reasonable: until last Sunday, Hollande didn’t even know whether or not he would become president of France. In contrast, Putin had at least two months to deal with personnel issues before the G8 meeting.

While the real reason(s) for Putin’s decision are known only to him, some guesses could be made. First, Putin didn’t want his first foreign trip as president to bring him in the United States, the country he often criticizes for meddling in Russia’s domestic affairs; one would rather expect Putin traveling to Astana or Beijing. Second, Putin naturally tries to avoid the intense media attention that his appearance at the summit would have elicited – with inevitable questions from the press about protest actions accompanying the May 7 inauguration. Third, Putin sends a clear message that Russia doesn’t value its G8 membership as much as it did in the past; these days, it favors the G20 format. Fourth, planning for his long-anticipated meeting with Obama, Putin wants to deprive his American counterpart of the home advantage; Putin will feel more comfortable playing on a neutral field in Mexico during the mid-June G20 summit. Finally, Putin makes it obvious that he’s not going to invest much effort into relationship with Obama until the latter is re-elected in November.

At Camp David, Russia will be represented by Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, confirming a prediction made by the Forbes magazine that under Putin, Medvedev will play an active role in foreign affairs, including attending high-profile international events. Yet, Medvedev’s very first mission of honor has been already spoiled by the way Putin introduced it. For the past few weeks, Medvedev has been actively working on the formation of the future Cabinet. Now, it appears that it’s Putin not Medvedev who has the final word on the structure and composition of Medvedev’s government. Medvedev’s interlocutors at the summit will have a reason to treat him as a child who was sent to play in the courtyard while daddy is checking his homework. Hopefully, in the future, Putin won’t abuse Medvedev’s willingness to serve as a messenger (remember: “I will pass this information to Vladimir?”). Doing so will leave Russia underrepresented at the world forums, which may eventually hurt its national interests.

Today, Obama responded in kind by refusing to attend the APEC summit in Vladivostok, Russia, on Sep. 1-8. This news is likely to bring some relief to my relatives in Vladivostok who can’t wait until this whole APEC madness is over and they can reclaim their normal lives.

As someone who moved from Russia to the United States as an adult, I know firsthand the difficulties of adapting to life in foreign country. New language, new culture, new rules of intra-personal relations, new climate and new food – all dawn upon you at once.

An intrinsic, if not fully appreciated, part of the adaptation process is getting used to a new set of holidays. This isn’t as trivial as it might seem: the order of American holidays often challenges the biological clock set up back in Russia. Additionally, the meaning of some of them is not always obvious to a newcomer. Eventually you settle, of course. First, you stop celebrating the official Russian holidays you remember from childhood: the Day of the October Revolution on November 7 and the Day of International Solidarity of Workers on May 1. In the United States, the Independence Day on July 4 becomes a proxy for both. Then you stop buying flowers for your wife on March 8 (International Women’s Day), although mandatory attendance at an expensive restaurant on Valentine’s Day may not appear to you as a sensible replacement. Over time, New Year’s Day, the most cherished holiday in Russia, turns into an extension of Christmas.  Finally, you realize that Thanksgiving, a day that you never heard of before moving to the U.S., has gradually become your favorite holiday.

There is, however, a Russian holiday that will always find place on my busy calendar.  It’s May 9 – Victory Day, the day commemorating the end of the World War II, known by Russians as the Great Patriotic War.  I belong to the first post-war generation, so my memory of the war can only be called historic, derived as it was from reading books and watching movies about this part of Russia’s tragic and glorious past. But although I have no memories of the fighting or the deprivations of the war years, I have my own memories of the annual military parades that take place every year on this day in Moscow’s Red Square. As a boy, I spent the morning sitting in front of a TV set, afraid to miss a blink. And then, there were war veterans filling the streets in the afternoon, their clothes shining with gold and silver of military decorations. They looked so old to me back then; today, I realize that many of them were younger than I am now.

These days, my 87-year-old mother helps my wife and me remember and celebrate this day. Every year on May 9, all three of us have a celebration dinner.  We eat Russian food, drink vodka and listen to my Mom’s “war stories.”  My wife and I already know all of them by heart, so that we can always add an important detail that Mom has forgotten since last time. A year ago, she reminded us how one night in February 1943, she was chased by a stranger who apparently wanted to rob her of bread stamps she just received. Without looking back or even screaming, Mom made the run of her life knowing that should she lose this race, her parents and two sisters would have no bread for the rest of the month. Before the dinner is over, Mom always tells my favorite story: how she learned that the war was over. She remembers exactly the time of the day and the street in Vladivostok she was on when she heard the radio announcement by the legendary Yuri Levitan. The weather was beautiful, of course, and, sure, she remembers the dress she wore that day.

Sometimes, we’re joined for dinner by our grown-up, perfectly American children. They are not expected to share the emotional atmosphere of the occasion; sitting around the table and politely listening to the conversation is all what is expected from them. As parents, we take pride in the fact that in contrast to many of their friends – and, I suspect, some U.S. politicians – our kids at least know that in the World War II, the United States and Russia were allies, not foes.

This year, Victory Day falls on a weekday, so our kids are unlikely to visit us.  I wish they could.  A couple of hours every year is not a high price to pay for reminding ourselves that the history of mankind doesn’t split along the country borders or generation lines.  It’s our common history.  And the victory we are to celebrate on May 9 is not only victory for us and our parents; it’s also victory for our children and their future children too.

For our Victory Day and yours! Cheers!

First, Medvedev isn’t going to be a “technical” prime minister in the sense Putin’s two previous heads of government, Mikhail Fradkov and Viktor Zubkov, were. To be sure, even as Chairman of United Russia, the future Prime Minister Medvedev won’t possess the same level of authority and autonomy that his mentor Putin had enjoyed in 2008-2012. Nevertheless, the combination of the two positions will definitely elevate Medvedev’s status and may help him establish himself as a bona fide second person in the state hierarchy.

Second, some analysts speculated that by offering Medvedev the prime minister position, Putin was simply fulfilling his part of the “swap” deal announced last September; some even predicted that Medvedev’s government wouldn’t last until fall and that Putin was already looking for a replacement. Putin’s decision to charge Medvedev with heading United Russia seems to put an end to this speculation. Of course, as president, Putin can fire his prime minister at any time – and the current Duma will promptly agree. Yet, getting control simultaneously over government, United Russia, and, indirectly, the Duma where United Russia has a working majority provides Medvedev with significant ammunition against his numerous foes among the elites. Far from firing Medvedev within months, the proposed arrangement rather suggests that Putin is willing to keep Medvedev for the whole presidential term. That’s perhaps what Medvedev had in mind when telling in a recent TV interview that the upcoming power configuration is “for a long haul.”

By placing his junior “tandem” partner in charge of government and Russia’s largest political party Putin has done everything at his disposal to let Medvedev become a political figure in his own right. Now, it’s up to Medvedev to prove that he can grow to the occasion.

Getting in order his relationship with United Russia will be important part of this process. In the past, Medvedev criticized the “edinorosses,” in particular, for using excessive administrative resources in the regional elections. Besides, by using liberal lingo during his own presidency, Medvedev was deliberately, if cautiously, positioning himself to the right of the left-of-center United Russia. It was therefore surprising for many to hear Medvedev’s admission – made during a meeting with the United Russia leadership – that he had never been “a liberal” and always adhered to “conservative values.”

There is nothing surprising in Medvedev’s statement. As a true “putinist,” Medvedev has long learned the art of acquiring, dropping or changing ideological “values” for the sake of political expediency. Like Putin, he doesn’t really care about United Russia’s current ideological flavor; like Putin, he considers the party as a commodity, a dispensable tool for stamping executive decisions sent to the Duma. However, given that Medvedev dreams of another presidential term, he needs a political base of his own and will certainly attempt to transform United Russia into a suitable vehicle to presidency. The party chapter – modified in 2008 to accommodate Putin’s becoming United Russia’s leader – gives its chairman essentially unlimited power, especially in the area of personnel decisions. Should the upcoming United Russia congress (scheduled for the end of the month) leave the party chapter unchanged, Medvedev will have all the means to restructure United Russia to his liking.

Putin’s inauguration on May 7 will mark the official conclusion of the “Operation Swap.” On May 8, the “Operation Successor II” will officially begin. With a track record of being a successor to Putin already – and with positions of prime minister and chairman of United Russia under his belt – Medvedev will have all the reasons to consider himself the leading candidate. It’s unlikely, however, that in 2018, simply passing the baton from Putin to a successor will be enough.

I wonder how many members of the U.S. Congress have heard of Adam Montoya. In 2009, Montoya was sentenced to a prison term for counterfeiting commercial checks and credits cards. Shortly after arriving at the Pekin, Illinois, federal penitentiary, Montoya began complaining of abdomen pain.  For nine days, he pleaded with his guards to take him to the doctor; they refused and instead gave him Tylenol. On the evening of Nov. 12, 2009, Montoya reported having trouble breathing; a prison staffer promised to get him help the next day. But next morning, Montoya was found dead in his cells. The autopsy showed that he had died of internal bleeding caused by a burst spleen. Last year, the U.S. Department of Justice denied a wrongful death and personal injury claim filed by the Montoya family.

The Montoya case is unlikely to reach Capitol Hill.  Our lawmakers have no interest in the death of an “ordinary” victim of the U.S. criminal justice system; they prefer instead high-profile cases in distant countries.  Take, for example, that of Sergei Magnitsky, a tax attorney who died under suspicious circumstances in Russian police custody on Nov. 16, 2009 (what a sad coincidence!). After having accused a number of Russian law-enforcement officials in the embezzlement of funds from the state Treasury, Magnitsky was arrested and kept in detention without trial for almost a year.  For five days prior to his death, Magnitsky had complained of worsening stomach pain, but received no medical treatment.

No American interests were damaged in the Magnitsky case, but this didn’t prevent Sen. Ben Cardin (D-Maryland) from introducing, last May, of the “Magnitsky bill” (S. 1039).  The bill would deny U.S. visas to Russian officials implicated in Magnitsky’s death and also freeze their financial assets in the United States. Last week, a similar bill (H.R. 4405) was introduced in the House of Representatives by James McGovern (D-Mass.).

Expressing concerns that the adoption of the bill would hurt U.S.-Russia relations, the Obama administration took a preventive step: last summer, the State Department composed a list of 60 individuals related to Magnitsky’s death whose entry in the U.S. would be prohibited; the administration then argued that the composed list would make S. 1039 “redundant.” In addition, the White House wrote a memo highlighting multiple shortcomings of the bill. In particular, it was argued that the criteria for placing names on the “Magnitsky list” were so ambiguous that it would set a bad precedent for how the United States deals with human rights cases around the world.

In recent weeks, the Magnitsky bill returned to the focus of congressional attention; the reason is Russia’s upcoming accession to the World Trade Organization. Discussion is underway in Congress on what to do with the Jackson-Vanik amendment, the notorious relic of the Cold War that still deprives Russia of the permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) status as a punishment for a policy restricting Jewish emigration in the 1970s.  The Obama administration wants the amendment to be lifted arguing that with Russia in the WTO, not granting it the PNTR status will hurt interests of American businesses.  While agreeing with the White House that the amendment should go, many in Congress refuse to just repeal it; they insist that something else should be put in place to hold Moscow accountable for what they habitually call “human-right abuses.”  A consensus is growing that the Magnitsky bill must be adopted first, followed by the repeal of the Jackson-Vanik amendment and granting Russia the PNTR status.

Interestingly, the Obama administration’s original opposition to S. 1039 seems to be gradually morphing into almost enthusiastic support – a change of heart driven by the Department of State and personally Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Appearing before Senate Foreign Relation Committee in February, Clinton called again for lifting the Jackson-Vanik amendment, but stressed the “need to send a clear, unmistakable message to Russia that we care deeply about rule of law in Russia.” Clinton then suggested that Cardin could work with the White House to “achieve both goals.” Recently, Cardin came up with a modified version of the bill; the new version makes it more difficult to add names to the list of human right violators the bill would create.  Incidentally, the House version of the bill, too, takes into account a number of concerns articulated in the White House’s memo of last year .

Reiterating Moscow’s known opposition to the bill, Russian Ambassador to the United States Sergey Kislyak warned Congress that passage of the bill could “impair the ability” of the United States and Russia to work together on important issues.  He also promised that there would be “significant reaction” in Russia to any attempt to link the PNTR status with the subject of human rights in Russia.  As the adoption of the Magnitsky bill looks imminent, the Kremlin should start thinking what precisely this “reaction” will be.

The “protest virus” isn’t going anywhere; it has already become part of Russia’s social DNA. It’s the symptoms of the “infection” that are evolving: from the acute form of street protests to the chronic expression of public discontent in local elections and social media. Besides, it is spreading, moving from Moscow to the regions. There is little doubt that the episodes of the “protest fervor” that took place in Tolyatti, Yaroslavl and Astrakhan will be regularly reproduced all across the country.

So far, the regime has shown certain clumsiness in adjusting to the new reality. The first reaction was a sincere surprise at the very existence of the protest movement; that rapidly morphed into attempts to denigrate and insult the protesters.  Then the authorities decided to “match” the protest actions with a showcase of massive public support of their own.  Finally, having realized that a stronger medicine was needed, the Kremlin decided to re-adjust the tools it utilized in the past to control the political process. A new law on political party registration has been hastily adopted; a law on direct election of regional governors is next.

At the moment, the regime’s biggest headache is the situation in Astrakhan, where the “spravoross” Oleg Shein went on hunger strike after refusing to accept the results of the mayoral election, which he allegedly lost. Used to deal with people predominantly occupied with their material well-being, the Kremlin appears to be completely at loss over what to do with a fellow seemingly ready to become a modern day Jesus Christ. It might have already dawned upon the Kremlin that should something bad happen to Shein, this is likely to coincide with, or to be perilously close to, the date of Putin’s inauguration.

The Shein controversy suggests that Russia lacks mechanisms of crisis management in the public sphere.  The country’s all-powerful executive treats any concession to the citizens as a sign of weakness. The representative organs – the Duma and the regional parliaments – are representative in the name only, with the perennial falsification of election results at all levels only exacerbating the situation. The judicial system, while making progress in resolving disputes between private parties, becomes utterly impotent when it comes to protecting legal rights of the citizens – or even politicians like Shein — against the powers-that-be.  Even the Church that in many countries regularly assumes crisis management functions is considered by many Russians as yet another branch of government.

A Crisis Management Agency of sorts – that Russia seems to sorely need — could be formed based on the Public Chamber, a bizarre institution whose raison-d’être was unclear at the time of its creation in 2005 and has remained such ever since. Many Russians are unlikely to even know that the Public Chamber exists, and the majority of those who do would have trouble to explain what the Public Chamber’s role is. On the other hand, due to its low profile, the Public Chamber doesn’t carry the negative baggage associated with other state institutions.

The core of the agency could be formed by members of the Public Chamber, with a number of affiliated members – chosen, perhaps, by a popular on-line vote — added to it. Additional individuals could be incorporated ad hoc if requested by interested parties.  The rules of the engagement would have to be established, but it seems obvious that should two parties ask the agency to intervene, they must promise to accept the agency’s recommendations.

Of course, no single solution is available to solve multiple problems facing the country.  But the worst the Kremlin can do is to listen to political virologists claiming that the problems don’t ever exist.

“Liberalism (from the Latin liberalis) is the belief in liberty and equality. Liberals espouse a wide array of views depending on their understanding of these principles, but generally liberals support ideas such as constitutionalism, liberal democracy, free and fair elections, human rights, capitalism, and the free exercise of religion.”

“Liberalism” (Wikipedia)

A high-ranked official from the United Russia party Andrei Isaev produced an anti-liberal manifesto, “What does the ideology of liberalism bring to Russia?”  (Yes, it’s that Isaev who on Dec. 30, while congratulating Russians with the approaching New Year, told them that in 2012, they will face “a new battle for the freedom and independence of Russia against attempts by the United State of America to establish control over our country.”)  Isaev is in charge of the party propaganda portfolio, so his desire to bring some ideological clarity — at the time when United Russia struggles to formulate its “ideology” – is quite understandable.

According to Isaev, the major ideological threat to Russia comes from liberalism, which, as Isaev regretfully notes, is becoming a “fashionable ideology” in the country.  Too bad, says Isaev.  It was liberals “who flooded France with blood” (that’s how Isaev interprets the historic events of the French Revolution).  It’s liberals who, while speaking of the freedom of religion, harass the Church, including as of late the Russian Orthodox Church.  And, to my great surprise, it was liberals who caused the split of Serbia and the creation of independent Kosovo.

Naturally, Isaev reserves the harshest words for the home-grown followers of liberalism:

“The major political recipe of [Russian] liberals is the return to the 90s when there were many parties, no parliamentary majorities, endless discussions going, and new Cabinets and coalitions [constantly] formed.”

What a horror! Compare that to the virtues of “social conservatism” espoused by Isaev.  Would it not be nice to have no political parties created without explicit nod from the Kremlin?  Would it not be nice for United Russia to always have the constitutional majority in the Duma (and the Duma itself being not a place for discussions)?  And would it not be nice to have the same ministers occupying their seats for years regardless of performance?  Heaven!

Quite expectedly, Isaev composed a long list of people responsible for the shameful perversion of the intrinsically conservative Russian soul; Grigory Yavlinsky, Mikhail Prokhorov, Alexey Kudrin and Igor Yurgens top the list.  Yet, I couldn’t shake off the impression that the real target of Isaev’s manifesto was none other than his fellow “edinoross” Vladimir Pligin, the chairman of the Duma committee on constitutional law.

Pligin is well-respected by the presidential administration and the Cabinet as the most prolific lawmaker of the United Russia Duma faction: for the past 12 months – even despite the distractions of the election season – Pligin has introduced 18 draft laws (compared to Isaev’s three).  Besides, he’s one of the very few people in the party leadership who does have coherent ideological views.  Recently, Pligin jumped into the ring by insisting that in order to remain relevant, United Russia must develop a solid liberal platform, morphing eventually into a right-of-center party.

As United Russia is facing unavoidable and unavoidably painful “re-branding” – with likely cadre reshuffling and even change of the formal leadership — the internal squabbles are bound to intensify.  And as it often happens in politics, fighting for the place under the sun takes shape of “ideological” debates.  It thus appears that Isaev’s anti-liberal fatwa is just one of the first salvos of the future battles.

Still unresolved is the issue of the relationship between the party and its chairman Vladimir Putin. Despite the fact that it was UR that nominated Putin as a candidate for the March 4 presidential election, Putin never mentioned it in the course of the election campaign.  Instead, Putin ran on the platform of the All-Russia People’s Front (ARPF), a motley pool of organizations hastily created last year.  The 238-deputy UR Duma faction now includes 80 members of ARPF who seem to have no other loyalty but personally to Putin.  Rumors abound that intra-fraction relations between members of UR and ARPF are lukewarm at best; some in UR consider the ARPF deputies the fifth column of sorts.

Recently, Putin suggested that ARPF should be upgraded into a “civil movement” – a clear step in the direction of creating a bona fide political party – and agreed to lead the new movement.  At the moment, the ultimate fate of ARPF is unclear and is likely tied to the decision to be taken by the Kremlin with regards to UR.  One of the proposed scenarios implies that ARPR will become a “left-of-center” political party with Putin at the helm, whereas UR will be transformed into a “right-of-center” party headed by the outgoing president Dmitry Medvedev.  According to another, if UR performs poorly in the regional elections in October, it will be “re-branded” by being swallowed by ARPF.

Some analysts argued that UR could be split into factions, possibly along the lines of “ideological clubs” (social-conservative, liberal-conservative, liberal, and patriotic) existing within the party.  The problem with this approach is that according to the electoral law, only members of the party that retains the UR party brand will keep seats in the Duma and regional parliaments, whereas members of the newly-formed “buds” will have to give away their deputy mandates.  Given the intense competition between the clubs and individual deputies, such a civilized split is highly unlikely, if possible at all.

That’s what apparently Putin had in mind when insisting last week that the unity of the UR Duma faction “should be preserved.”  The truth is that Putin doesn’t need UR – or any other political entity, including ARPF.  What he needs is a Duma that would rapidly – and without arguing — approve legislation proposed by the presidential administration and the Cabinet.  For as long as UR is capable of keeping the Duma at the easy disposal of the executive, the party will remain Putin’s first choice.  However, should UR begin losing elections – resulting in unruly parliaments — a Plan B will come into play.

Some of the questions surrounding the future of the party won’t be answered until the next party congress scheduled for early summer.  Facing long and unnerving uncertainty, the party officials began entertaining themselves with inventing the party ideology.  (The fact that created in 2001, UR still doesn’t have established ideology doesn’t seem to bother its leaders.)  The General Council has recently approved the creation of two large ideological “platforms:” social-conservative and liberal-conservative.  These platforms are expected to function as intra-party thinks tanks that would present competing legislative initiatives to the Council.

The “edinorosses” remind me of puppets who want to start playing their parts – despite the fact that the puppet master is yet to arrive in the theater.

U.S. Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul is likely to accomplish something none of his predecessors ever dreamed of: he is becoming a household name.  His ascension to the status of celebrity of sorts might be surprising; yet, it’s hardly accidental.

Attention to McFaul’s persona was first drawn last year when U.S. President Barack Obama surprisingly tapped him, a diplomatic novice, to replace seasoned career diplomat John Beyrle as the envoy to Moscow.  By nominating McFaul, the White House was sending a message that the Obama administration was going to pay more attention to the issue of human rights in Russia.  McFaul, one of the leading U.S. experts in “democracy promotion,” was supposed to personify this policy shift.  Characteristically, even sworn enemies of the administration’s Russia policy hailed McFaul’s nomination.

McFaul didn’t disappoint his supporters.  His “democracy promotion” credentials went to work immediately after his arrival in Moscow: In his second day on the job, McFaul invited a group of Russian opposition politicians and civil society activists to the ambassador’s residence, Spaso House.  The meeting was extensively covered by the Russian media.  It appears that hosting social events will become a prominent venue for McFaul to keep himself visible.  Last week, he threw a party featuring a folk band that was flown to Moscow from McFaul’s native Montana.  Images of the ambassador dancing with his wife were promptly made available to the electronic and print media.

In addition, McFaul is working hard to establish his presence in social networks.  His first post (in Russian) on LiveJournal, a popular blogging portal, appeared on the day of his arrival in Russia.  McFaul also opened a Twitter account where he writes both in English and Russian.

At the same time, the ambassador doesn’t forget what he promised during his Senate confirmation hearings: to meet regularly with the Russian opposition.  One such meeting got him in trouble.  Last Thursday, having arrived for a chat with the human rights activist Lev Ponomarev, McFaul was confronted by a group of young people with a camera who introduced themselves as reporters from the state-sponsored NTV station.  According to McFaul, for several minutes, the “crew” had prevented his from entering into the building.

Later, McFaul let his frustration into the open on Twitter.  He complained that the NTV reporters stalked him everywhere he went to and wondered how they knew his schedule.  McFaul even suggested that NTV employees read his emails and listen to his phone.

If someone hoped to treat this story as a benign street encounter, this hope was squashed by the U.S. State Department’s formal complaints to the Russian Foreign Ministry alleging that McFaul’s “security and safety” had been compromised.  Incidentally, this is not for the first time that Russian youngsters – with TV cameras or without – have harassed foreign diplomats, and it’s hard to believe that the Russian authorities weren’t aware of the accidents or couldn’t do anything about it.

Naturally, the NTV officials dismissed McFaul’s charges of eavesdropping and instead attributed their knowledge of the ambassador’s whereabouts to the extensive network of “informants.”  The Russian Public Chamber threw its support behind NTV, arguing that there was nothing wrong with journalists’ desire to “learn more about a public figure – an ambassador, a patriarch or politician.”  A patriarch?  Can anyone imagine an NTV crew constantly following Patriarch Kirill?

McFaul knows Russia well and is aware that “promoting democracy” there is a safe business for a foreign diplomat – as opposed to some other countries where his colleagues can leave the embassy compound only with an escort of armored vehicles.  Yet, having spent the bulk of his professional life in the academic environment, McFaul didn’t learn what other celebrities around the world know all too well: increased public profile comes at the price of reduced privacy and additional security challenges.  It’s now time for McFaul to learn this lesson.

At the same time, one can’t deny McFaul’s remarkable ability to use his current job position to advance future career aspirations.  Once can be sure that for the rest of his life – and certainly during his next Senate confirmation hearings – he’ll carry the NTV encounter as a badge of honor.

Questions, of course, vary but the most popular overall has been: Why do Russians not celebrate Thanksgiving?  My explanation that history of Russia doesn’t include interactions between the Pilgrims and the Indians doesn’t sound too convincing.  People seem to question my knowledge of the past and, perhaps, even my Russianness.  So one day I tried something different.  Why do Russians not celebrate Thanksgiving?  Because they can’t produce enough turkeys for every Russian family.  My interlocutor nodded approvingly at my thoughtfulness.

Some questions are so puzzling that I’m not even sure that I understand them correctly.  A young lady from Kansas asked me if Russians buried their dead.  Excuse me, reacted I incredulously, but of course, how else?  Apparently sensing that something was wrong, she murmured “Never mind” and changed the subject.

Yet my absolutely favorite question – asked only once but I still remember it – is this: Was your last czar (Nicolas II) also president?

Boldly considering myself not only bilingual, but truly bicultural, I take it as my civic duty to answer questions about America every time I visit Russia.  Back in 2000s, the most popular question my friends were asking me was: How much does it cost in America to buy a…?  Usually, it was a house.  I used to explain patiently that the price of real estate varied widely between different U.S. states, cities and even locations in the same city and that the extent of this variation could be as huge as the difference between the price for a one-room apartment in a provincial Russian town and the one for a mansion on Rublevka.

Then, I remember this old lady, a friend of my Mom, whose knowledge of America tracked back to the glorious times of the Cold War.  Having apparently decided to ask me an “educated” question, she soberly inquired: Well, how do ordinary Americans live these days?  (The miserable life of “ordinary Americans” was a regular concern raised by the Soviet media.)  I didn’t want to lie, but I didn’t want to disappoint her, either.  So I said: They are still struggling.  By her reaction, I knew this was something she wanted to hear.

Times change, and as my Russian friends freely travel around the world, they don’t need me anymore to acquire knowledge of foreign countries.  These days, the most frequent question I hear in Russia is: Did you see…?  The title of the newest Hollywood blockbuster follows.  Embarrassed, I defend myself by babbling that I don’t like going to the movies and usually wait until Hollywood masterpieces appear on Netflix.  Ouch.

Curiously, over all these years, I’ve never faced a hostile question.  No one ever asked me why Russia (America) wanted to destroy America (Russia).  True, I’m not a man who can give an order to destroy another country – and my interlocutors knew that.  However, I prefer to believe that the lack of such questions reflects the sense of quiet respect Americans and Russians hold towards each other.

Incidentally, measurements of public sentiments in both countries support this notion.  In Russia, 50% of those surveyed in a recent poll expressed positive attitude towards the U.S.; only 35% held negative views.  In the U.S., similar 50% of Americans held favorable views of Russia; this number was unsurprisingly higher among younger Americans.  So when politicians in both countries make stupid statements – that Russia is the United States’ “number one geopolitical foe” or that “the United States was keenly interested in destabilizing Russia” – they should know: they speak for themselves rather than for their constituents.

The way forward, as I see it, is to keep discovering each other, one question at a time.  So when you spot my unmistakably Russian accent, do shoot me a question about Russia.  Any question.  The only question I’ll refuse to answer is: This next president of yours.  Will he also be czar?

The Seoul Nuclear Security Symposium provided a set stage for the last summit between Russian president Dmitry Medvedev and his U.S. counterpart Barack Obama.  Speaking for the media after a 90-minute meeting, both leaders used the opportunity to showcase positive developments in U.S.-Russia relations — the New START treaty and Russia’s accession to the WTO, in particular — that have taken place over the past three years under their stewardship.  Both spoke about the urgent need to jumpstart economic and trade relations between the two countries.  Both paid tribute to the good personal chemistry that helped them keep the “reset” in U.S.-Russia relations on course.

The problems that divide Moscow and Washington have been mentioned too.  One of the most acute is a disagreement over approaches to ending violence in Syria; another, more chronic, is the lack of a shared vision on the architecture of European missile defense.  Choosing his words very carefully, Medvedev acknowledged that at the moment, Russia and the U.S. very taking dramatically different positions; yet, he argued that a room for a compromise still existed.  Obama concurred by saying that time was right for experts from both countries to begin detailed discussions on the technical aspects of this complex issue.

But any substantive discussion in the the Medvedev-Obama rendezvous was overshadowed by a gaffe that the media pounced on: chatting without interpreters between the conclusion of their one-on-one and the beginning of the media briefing, the presidents did not realize that the microphones were already on.  Continuing the conversation and referring apparently to Russian President-elect Vladimir Putin, Obama was heard as saying to Medvedev: “On all these issues, particularly on missile defense, this can be solved but it’s important for him to give me space.”  “I understand.  I understand your message about space.  Space for you,” Medvedev responded.  “This is my last election,” went on Obama, “After my election I have more flexibility.” “I understand,” again replied Medvedev, “I will pass this information to Vladimir.”

Gaffes at such a high level are bound to have domestic repercussions.  Medvedev got away lightly: his critics in Russia took advantage of the “pass this information to Vladimir” line to highlight the president’s lame-duck status.  But Obama found himself in hot water: the Republicans accused him of readiness to make concessions to Russia that could undermine the strength of U.S. missile defense.  House Speaker John Boehner (R-OH) said he would be curious to hear what the president meant by “flexibility.”

The leading GOP presidential candidate Mitt Romney immediately jumped into the ring and described Obama’s comments “an alarming and troubling development;” he went further, calling Russia the United States’ “number one geopolitical foe.”  Romney’s joy over Obama’s gaffe is understandable: he had a terrible week — with his own adviser comparing him to an Etch A Sketch toy.  Plagued with perennial accusations of being too “flexible” on issues, Romney was all too happy to hang onto something he has never wavered over: his opposition to Obama’s Russia policy, beginning with the New START treaty.

If Obama has learned anything during his 3+ years as president, it is how to conduct damage control.  Speaking to reporters the next day after his “open-mike” meeting with Medvedev, Obama made fun of his gaffe and then, turning serious, proceeded with describing missile defense as “extraordinary complex [and] very technical” issue.  Given this complexity, the president argued, it would be virtually impossible to win broad consensus in Congress for any major security agreement with Russia in an election year.  Deputy national security adviser Ben Rhodes in a statement re-iterated the boss’ message: “since 2012 is an election year in both countries…it is clearly not a year in which we are going to achieve a breakthrough,” Rhodes said.

There is no doubt that Romney as the Republican presidential nominee will attempt to make Obama’s Russia policy an election issue in November.  Expect images of the president cuddling with Medvedev in Seoul to be repeatedly played in TV ads produced by the Romney campaign.  It is however unlikely that the “flexibility” gaffe will have any serious negative impact on Obama’s re-election prospects.  Romney’s overly aggressive anti-Russian stance, including his opposition to the New START treaty, is not widely shared even among the Republicans — and is definitely unpopular with independent voters.  Besides, by recklessly calling Russia the United States’ “number one geopolitical foe,” Romney made it more difficult for himself to criticize the Obama administration’s policies toward China, Iran, and North Korea.

It was almost heartbreaking to watch how Medvedev and some Russian officials rushed to defend Obama against his GOP rival.  Relax, folks!  Obama is an adult and can stand for himself.  If Moscow really wants to see him re-elected, it could help by immediately stopping the ridiculous anti-American campaign that by now, with the Duma and presidential campaigns concluded, has completely outlived its usefulness.

Let’s give Obama a break.  Or, in his own words, space.