Putin and Elites

Posted on February 21, 2012 by

When supporters of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin argue that there is “no alternative to Putin” in the upcoming presidential election, what they have in mind is not the obvious weakness of four other candidates.  The meaning of the “no alternative to Putin” concept is broader: it implies that of all the people living on the Earth, Putin is the only person having experience and skills to serve as President of Russia for the foreseeable future.  Part of this conviction originates from the long-term Russian tradition of having a “national leader” – in whatever capacity — at the helm of the country; part of it reflects self-serving interests of the people benefiting from the current regime: state bureaucrats, United Russia party apparatchiks, and loyal businessmen.

Yet, it’s hard to deny that Putin has been one of the most successful statesmen in Russian history.  Of course, one can endlessly argue whether the collapse of Russia he is credited with preventing was imminent; or whether rising oil prices, not Putin’s statesmanship, were the main driver of the solid economic growth of 2000-2008.  One thing is clear: back in 2000, Putin understood the prevailing public sentiments, demands, and expectations.  He also recognized what kind of leadership Russia needed at the time – given its political and economic realities – and then was capable of providing exactly this kind of leadership.  Working in Putin’s favor has always been his reputation of a “real man,” sober workaholic, and efficient communicator.

What is usually less recognized — as a crucial factor of Putin’s success as president — is his ability to maintain consensus among Russian elites.  Putin has been remarkably efficient in his role of a supreme arbiter overseeing complex network of interactions between different, often feuding, special interests: “energy” and “finance” factions of the Cabinet; “chekists” and “jurists;” “liberals” and “conservatives.”  By listening to all sides and forcing them to compromise, Putin was preventing conflicts between elites before they festered – or, at the very least, before they boiled into the open.  As Putin’s close ally, former deputy prime minister Alexey Kudrin, said recently:

“Putin possesses a remarkable ability to listen to arguments [of all sides] before making a decision…So far, [he] has been successful in keeping a balance between positions of very different factions of government.”

Naturally, cementing Putin’s special position at the very top of the “power vertical” have been his sky-high personal approval ratings, as well as high ratings of his “pedestal” party, United Russia.  Equally important for the elites was the ability of the Putin team to deliver solid numbers for him and his party in the presidential and parliamentary elections.

Things began to unravel after Putin moved from the Kremlin to the White House.  The 2008 economic crisis has frightened elites lulled by Putin’s pre-crisis claims of Russia being an “island of stability.”

Attempts, however timid, by Putin’s “successor,” Dmitry Medvedev to become an independent center of power unnerved conservative factions of the elites; they became concerned that Medvedev’s reforms may go “out of control.”  Ultimately, Putin had to intervene by preventing Medvedev from running for the second presidential term.  However, Putin’s announcement that he’s returning to the Kremlin was met with unexpectedly broad public criticism – confirming the results of numerous sociological studies suggesting that the proverbial “Putin’s majority” was crumbling.  And scandalous televised firing of Kudrin by Medvedev created the impression that Putin wasn’t completely in control of the situation.

Putin’s once stratospheric approval ratings went down: in 2011, he lost as many as 15 points.  Finally, poorer than expected showing of the United Russia party in the Duma election proved that the Putin team can no longer deliver “target” election results at will.

Certainly, at the moment, there is no indication that a serious split among Russian elites has emerged, much less that Putin has completely lost his magic touch (that “Akela has missed,” in the words of Putin’s favorite Rudyard Kipling).  Moreover, Putin has embarked on a damage control aimed at reasserting his authority.  A number of public rallies in support of Putin the candidate were organized; the number of participants in these rallies in most cases exceeded the size of anti-Putin protest crowds.  In addition, while traditionally refusing to take part in TV debates with other candidates, Putin’s running surprisingly active campaign by publishing campaign manifestos, making lavish promises, and crisscrossing the country for photo-ops.  As a result, his ratings are on the rise again, virtually ensuring his victory in the first round of the vote.

It’s commonly assumed that political reforms recently proposed by President Medvedev – and grudgingly endorsed by Putin – were meant to be a response to the protest movement of “angry urbanites.”  However, the very scope and detailed nature of the proposed legislation lend credit to Medvedev’s claim that they were prepared well in advance of the Duma elections, in spring of 2011.  It seems logic that back then, Medvedev’s proposals were blocked by the conservatives who had Putin by their side.  If so, then Putin’s sudden acceptance of the reformist ideas might not be a concession to protesters, but rather an olive branch to the members of the reformist camp of the elites who are visibly upset with what happened to Medvedev.

The rapid political maturation of Russia’s middle class has been a rude awakening for the country’s political elites and gives them one more reason to feel worried.  The elites will be closely watching Putin for any signs that he’s no more in a position to best serve their interests.  Should they finally decide that Putin has exhausted his potential, an alternative to him will be found.  This change may coincide with the next presidential election.  It may not.

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Putin and the Polls

Posted on February 16, 2012 by

The head of staff of Vladimir Putin’s presidential election campaign, Stanislav Govorukhin, gave yet another interview, where he predicted that his candidate will win in the first (March 4) round of the election with “at least 60% of the vote.”  Just a couple of weeks ago, Govorukhin considered a possibility of the second round.  Not anymore: referring to “more information” in his possession (he didn’t elaborate), Govorukhin insisted that everything will be settled on March 4.

Govorukhin seems to have a point: all three major Russian polling agencies — FOM, Levada Center, and VTSIOM – forecast Putin’s straightforward victory.  When undecided voters and those not intended to vote are subtracted, the percentage of respondents willing to vote for Putin vary between 59 % and 67%.

Given my stated distrust in FOM, Levada and VTSIOM, I attempted to come up with my own estimate of Putin’s electability – using the 2010 census data taken from a recent Vedomosti article.  According to the data, 44 million Russians live in large cities with the population of more than half-million (Group A); 75 million live in small towns and in the countryside (Group B); and 25 million live in underdeveloped regions including the “national enclaves,” such as Chechnya, Dagestan, and Ingushetia (Group C).  Roughly 63% of Russians are registered voters.

I made a number of assumptions — and I strongly encourage the readers of this post to try theirs.  I assumed that the percentage of voters voting for Putin will be 45% in Group A, 60% in Group B and 75% in Group C; I also assumed a uniform turnover of 70% for all three groups.  With these assumptions in place, the total vote for Putin would be 58% (36.8 million votes per 63.4 of those who had voted), which is reasonably close to other predictions.  Naturally, this number will go up if, say, in Group C the reported turnover will be higher than 70%: for example, a 90% turnover would increase the total vote for Putin to almost 62%.  In my scheme, in order for Putin to get less than 50% of the vote, he should poll no more than 50% in Group B – and I can’t go lower here – and no more than 32-33% in Group A.  The last number might be true for Moscow and St. Petersburg (and, perhaps, Novosibirsk), but hardly for the group in general — given the fact that Putin’s personal popularity is still reasonably high and definitely higher than that of the United Russia party.  Therefore, with all due reservations about my assumptions, I estimate Putin’s “real” electability being in the 55%-60% range.

One can often hear a rhetoric question: if Putin is so genuinely popular, why would he not compete and win in completely honest elections?  The answer is rather simple: Putin’s election campaign team just doesn’t know how to run honest elections.  (It’s like asking a producer of nasty TV negative ads to write a polite concession speech.)  They can only operate with the heavy use of the notorious “administrative resource.”  Besides, they are not interested in the election process; their God is the election results.  Those are planned in advance and then enforced by delivering appropriate target numbers to regional authorities.  Otherwise, how would one explain the fact that in the presidential elections in 2004 and 2008 Putin and Medvedev got essentially the same percentage of the vote (71% and 70%)?

Regardless of what Putin could have won in completely clean and fair elections, the final tally will only reflect what his election team will be capable of producing.  Two competing trends seem to be currently at play.  One the one hand, Putin is supposed to win in the first round of the vote with the result ideally approaching the 71% of the vote he collected in 2004 – to buttress Putin’s image of a “national leader” and re-insure the elites in his ability to protect their privileged political and economic interests in the future.  One the other hand, Putin’s victory should ideally give his critics no serious ground for questioning the legitimacy of the election, thus depriving the opposition of any reason to continue street protests.  The difficult compromise is likely to be found by maximally reducing the election fraud in Moscow and other large cities – where election observers will stand fully prepared to spot voting violations — and by making up the “balance” in province and “national enclaves” where the control of the election process is traditionally weak, if existing at all.

During his recent public appearances, Putin stressed his desire to have completely clean and unbiased election.  Yet, he can’t be so naïve not to know that the System he’s helped create over the past 12 years has gone out of his control.  The truck he started and set in motion doesn’t respond anymore to his timid attempts to steer the wheel.  No doubt, Putin will become the next President of Russia, yet, ironically, he may never know how many people actually voted for him on March 4.

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The Dinosaur

Posted on February 9, 2012 by

There is a trend among Russia watchers to ridicule the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) and its eccentric leader, the dinosaur of Russian politics Vladimir Zhirinovsky.  Famous for his larger-than-life personality, skillful showmanship and occasional fistfights with fellow Duma deputies, Zhirinovsky is often caricatured as a “clown” (which, incidentally, doesn’t prevent him from coming out of public polls as one of the most popular Russian politicians).  Yet those who have taken the time to study Zhirinovsky’s positions on issues would be surprised to see that some important decisions of Vladimir Putin’s 2000-2008 presidencies may have had their origin in the LDPR program documents.

Recently, it was Putin himself who acknowledged Zhirinovsky’s “sensible ideas.”  During a public appearance, Putin recalled that following the 2000 decision to divide Russia into seven federal districts headed by plenipotentiary representatives, Zhirinovsky came to him to claim being the author of the arrangement.  Indeed, one of the LDPR’s stated strategic goals has always been to transform Russia from an “amorphous” federation into a strong unitary state.  LDPR asserted that the current national-territorial principle of state formation – with ethnic-based “national” republics and districts – threatens Russia’s integrity because of the danger of separatism.  To counter this threat, LDPR has long advocated coming back to the structure of pre-revolutionary Russia — with its division into 25-30 completely equal in their status territories (“guberniya”).  Composed of about 5 million residents each, these territories should be formed based strictly on geographic and economic considerations and have elected legislative assemblies, but no constitutions of their own.  The head of guberniya, governor, should be appointed by president.  It’s easy to see that by encompassing “traditional” regions – regardless of their status – and creating a supra-regional level of authority, Putin’s federal districts clearly followed the territorial principle of state formation.  Furthermore, in 2004, Putin scrapped popular elections of regional governors.

Putin called the similarities between his scheme and the LDPR’s proposals “coincidental.”  If so, it raises an interesting point: having become president, Putin apparently didn’t bother to take a look at the program documents of political parties represented in the Duma.

As a matter of fact, the list of “coincidences” is a bit longer.  In order to make the structure of federal authorities fit the territorial principle of state formation, LDPR called for a single-chamber Duma elected strictly by political party lists.  The upper chamber of the parliament, the Federation Council, was to be dissolved and replaced with the State Council.  In 2004, Putin eliminated single-mandate electoral districts and introduced the strictly proportional, party list, system of Duma elections.  Moreover, the creation, in 2000, of the “advisory” State Council — composed of president and regional governors — have certainly undermined the authority of the still existing Federation Council.

There is nothing “coincidental” in the way Putin and Zhirinovsky view Russia’s political structure.  Both are devout statists and consider strong federal authority as the major prerequisite for preserving the territorial integrity of the country.  At the same time, the similarity of their positions with regards to Russia’s state formation could serve as a response to those who routinely criticize Zhirinovsky for being too supportive of Putin.  Why would Zhirinovsky oppose him if Putin has implemented the most important positions of the LDPR party program?

Zhirinovsky is an experienced presidential candidate: he ran in 1991, 1996, 2000, and 2008.  This presidential election is his fifth and likely the last.  On Feb.1, the Izvestia daily published Zhirinovsky’s program article, “Where Russia should go.”  With all due respect to other candidates’ published manifestos, this piece is the only one you can read without risking to fall asleep.

Zhirinovsky begins with his pet idea to replace the “non-Russian” word “president” with something native: глава or правитель.  He then proceeds to another pet idea of his: to transform Russia into parliamentary republic with 5-7 political parties represented in the Duma.  The Duma should form government and choose the head of state, president, for a single 5-year term.

It’s almost a common place to call Zhirinovsky “ultra-nationalists;” yet his article reveals not much “nationalist” and definitely nothing “ultra.”  Zhirinovsky repeats his mantra of the “oppressed Russian people” and – referring to the fact that ethnic Russians constitute about 80% of the Russian population – calls for pronouncing Russians the “state-forming nation.”  He also reiterates his well-known opposition to illegal immigration.  This is hardly more “nationalistic” than Putin’s proposal to regulate internal migration from the North Caucasus region.  (In the United States, Mitt Romney, the leading Republican presidential candidate, calls for the “self-deportation” of illegal immigrants and is still considered a “moderate Republican.”)

The rest of the piece is a classic pre-election populism: drug and alcohol abuse, declining standards of education, pitiful state of the armed forces, and – Zhirinovsky’s signature topic – hard life conditions for Russian women, “the best and most beautiful in the world.”

In contrast to his perennial rival, the head of the Communist Party Gennady Zyuganov, Zhirinovsky is cautiously supportive of the anti-Putin protests on Bolotnay Square and Sakharov Prospect, saying that the Russian society is tired of “being constantly lied” to by the authorities.

Zhirinovsky is almost 66 and he looks old and exhausted.  It seems that the only thing that has driven him in the past few years was his desire to “transfer” LDPR to his son, Igor Lebedev, the head of the LDPR faction in the Duma.  Lebedev, who’s 40, is a competent and experienced parliamentarian; yet he completely lacks his father’s charisma and showmanship.  With Zhirinovsky having been the face, soul and the mouth of LDPR for so long, it’ll be extremely difficult, if possible at all, for Lebedev to keep the party together.  Rather, with Zhirinovsky gone, his party’s ideas will be rapidly appropriated by other political forces.  And so will be the LDPR electorate.

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The Campaign

Posted on February 1, 2012 by

The head of staff of Vladimir Putin’s presidential election campaign, Stanislav Govorukhin, gave an interview to the Izvestia daily, where he shared a few interesting details about Putin’s ongoing quest for the third presidency.

First, Govorukhin criticized President Dmitry Medvedev, the very man who nominated Putin for presidency, for not campaigning for the nominee.  Govorukhin might have a point here, yet the significance of Medvedev staying on the sidelines isn’t exactly clear.  On the one hand, Putin doesn’t really need Medvedev campaigning for him: his own ratings are higher than those of the lame-duck president.  On the other hand, Medvedev’s absence on the campaign trail is fueling rumors of a growing split between members of the crumbling “tandem.”  At the very least, it’s fair to say that by ignoring Putin’s campaign, Medvedev doesn’t improve his chances of becoming prime minister in the future Putin administration.

Second, Govorukhin agreed that by running his campaign on the platform of the All-Russia People’s Front, Putin deliberately distances himself from the United Russia party, whose chairman he officially is.   This demoralizes the party’s functionaries, especially in the regions, and puts its leadership in a difficult position.  Like ivy, United Russia is incapable of standing alone; it can only exist by creeping over the body of a “national leader.”  The “edinorosses” still pretend that Putin’s swing with the Front is just a short-term opportunistic affair brought about by purely tactical considerations and that after winning the election, Putin will return to the party fold.  If this doesn’t happen – because, for example, Putin has long-term plans for the Front or decides to become a “nonpartisan” president – United Russia is finished.  It will collapse upon the first attempt to reform it.

Third, Govorukhin admitted that the election campaign staff he’s presiding over is no more than a front for the operation, whereas the real decision-making process is taking place in a shadow staff headed by the deputy chief of the presidential administration Vyacheslav Volodin.  Given Russia’s political realities, there is no sense in discussing the legality of this arrangement.  However, one would wonder how Medvedev can function as president when his administration is busy with running the election campaign of his own prime minister.

As every efficient Russian bureaucrat, Volodin is publicity shy and prefers leading “from behind.”  A message that he reportedly sent to the regional governors included two orders: to make the March 4 elections as clean as possible and to ensure Putin’s victory in the first round of the vote.  Cynics would argue that the two demands can’t possibly be met at the same time.  Yet, the meaning of Volodin’s message is very clear to its shrewd recipients: on March 4, Putin must get over 50% of the vote without giving the opposition any tangible evidence of the election fraud.

And that’s where Russian polling agencies step in.  One of them, VTSIOM, reported that the number of Russians willing to vote for Putin grew by a whopping 7% in the first two weeks of the year, reaching 52% on Jan. 14.  Yet, VTSIOM’s general director, Valery Fedorov, urged supporters of the candidate not to become too complacent.  Interestingly, Fedorov made this remark at a meeting sponsored by Putin’s All-Russia People’s Front, an awkward venue for a man whose agency’s polls will later be used as evidence of authenticity of the election results.

Two other major Russian polling agencies, FOM and Levada Center, gave slightly smaller figures for Putin’s ratings: 44% and 37%, respectively.  However, given even lower numbers polled by Putin’s opponents, the data strongly suggest that Putin’s victory in the first round of the vote is all by assured.

Yet, the differences between the three forecasts seem to suggest that the Kremlin remains undecided on the precise number of the vote Putin should receive on March 4.  Anything close to the 53% won by Putin in 2000 will be considered a serious blow to his reputation of a “national leader” and may force the conservative part of the elites question his ability to protect their privileged political and economic interests.  On the other hand, any result approaching the 71% of the vote collected by Putin in 2004 will only energize the critics of the regime and may lead to the escalation of the street protests.  It would seem that the final decision will be made toward the end of the month and this decision will take into account a number of factors, including the relative strength of pro- and anti-Putin demonstrations scheduled for the coming Saturday.

Once the “target” number of the “for Putin” vote is established, it will be promptly communicated to VTSIOM, FOM and Levada Center for the subsequent use in pre-election and exit polling.

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Bad Date

Posted on January 27, 2012 by

                                      (This piece originally appeared on Russia Beyond the Headlines)

Michael McFaul, the sixth U.S. ambassador to post-Soviet Russia, arrived in Moscow on Saturday, Jan. 14.  On Monday, his first day on the job, McFaul met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov.  The next day, McFaul invited a group of Russian politicians and civil-society activists for a short meeting at the Spaso House, U.S. ambassador’s residence. 

McFaul came in Moscow at a challenging time in U.S.-Russia relations: the “reset,” of which he is widely considered one of the architects, has obviously stalled over a host of difficult issues, such as European missile defense and Russia’s position on Syria and Iran.  Making things worse, anti-American rhetoric has been on the rise in the past few weeks after Prime Minister Vladimir Putin accused U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton of inciting the anti-government protests that swept Moscow and other Russian cities in December.

Complicating McFaul’s life even further are the presidential elections taking place in both countries.  It seems almost certain that no serious decision concerning U.S.-Russia relations can be made or even contemplated until after Putin’s expected inauguration in May. Given the lack of warmth between Putin and U.S. President Barack Obama, it’s also unlikely that Putin will move quickly to establish solid rapport with him until Obama is re-elected.  Moreover, should a Republican president move into the White House next January, the very fate of the “reset” will become uncertain.  Nor is it certain at all that a Republican president will keep McFaul in Moscow.  It’s therefore conceivable that in the best case scenario, this year, McFaul won’t be extremely busy with his ambassadorial duties.  In the worst case scenario, this year will be his last.

But let’s not forget that Michael McFaul is not only one of the architects of the “reset;” he’s even better known as one of the leading U.S. experts in “democracy promotion.”  (His latest book is titled “Advancing democracy abroad: why we should and how we can.”)  Speaking of McFaul at the swearing ceremony, his new boss, Hillary Clinton, said:

“Few Americans know Russia or know democracy better than Mike McFaul.  And I can think of no better representative of our values and our interest in a strong, politically vibrant, open, democratic Russia, as well as a deepening U.S.-Russian partnership.”

Was it by accident that in this sentence, Clinton mentioned “democratic Russia” before “a deepening U.S.-Russian partnership?”

By sending the prominent expert in “democracy promotion” McFaul to Moscow, the Obama administration is trying to appease the critics of the “reset” who charge that its benefits came at the expense of what they call “Russia’s deteriorating human right situation.”  Evidently, the attempts by the administration to show that the focus of its Russia policy is shifting to human rights issues have not been lost on Obama’s critics.  Mark Kirk, the hawkish senator from Illinois who voted for McFaul’s confirmation, said that he was the right man for the job:

“I will be supporting his nomination also because he will be good in working with the opposition and human rights communities in Russia.”

And “working with the opposition” is exactly what McFaul is going to do in Moscow, as his second day on the job clearly shows.  Being aware that he may not be able to buttress his reputation as an architect of the “reset,” McFaul may have decided to use his new position to advance his credentials as expert on “democracy promotion.”  For future use.

While McFaul’s objectives for the date with members of the Russian opposition might be well understood, the same can’t be said about his Russian sweethearts.  Sure, their loyalty to McFaul, who always showed his support for them, is commendable.  But now that hundreds of thousands of ordinary Russians around the country have hit the streets in the protest actions organized by the opposition, it’s time for the opposition leaders to realize that they have another, more important, constituency to care about; it’s time for them to reassess their priorities – and to learn how to explain them.  The people who came to the Embassy – all no strangers to media attention – could at the very least tell the journalists blocking the entrance to the Spaso House about the goals of their meeting with McFaul.  Instead, they were sneaking inside the building as if deliberately trying to project an image of co-conspirators heading for a secret gathering.  One could call unwarranted or even insulting Putin’s insinuations of the foreign involvement in the protest movement.  Yet McFaul’s dates did a great job in lending support to such insinuations.

The Kremlin likes to point to the marginal character of the Russian opposition: no single leader, no unified platform, and no brazen ideas.  This is true: when you treat the grass around your house with napalm, it’s difficult to expect your lawn being of a golf-course quality.  But the opposition does exist, and for the first time ever, it may even have broad public support.  Not to lose the moment, the opposition leaders must rapidly grow up.  Generating ideas and creating platforms may take years.  Learning fundamental lessons of good behavior shouldn’t take this long.  This is one of them: always consider very carefully from whom you accept a date. Even if you enjoyed it, it could still turn out to be bad for your reputation.

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Enemy at the door, continued

Posted on January 18, 2012 by

A few weeks ago, I wrote that Russia’s foreign policy wasn’t an issue during the Dec. 4 Duma election campaign; however, I predicted that it may become such in the run-up to the March 4 presidential election.  No, I didn’t expect Russian voters to suddenly fall in love with the complicated issue of European missile defense.  Yet, it wasn’t beyond imagination to see politicians invoking the specter of the foreign enemy at Russia’s door to score “domestic” points.

The trend was initiated by Russia’s leading presidential candidate, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.  On Dec. 15, during his televised “town-hall” meeting, Putin accused U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in inciting the protest actions that erupted in the wake of announcing the Duma election results.  Putin hasn’t repeated this accusation since, but in the recently released election manifesto, he made it clear that he considered the United State unfriendly (“destructive”) force guilty of “democracy promotion” through the barrel of the gun.

In Russia, as everywhere else, the word of the boss is the law for subordinates.  Following Putin’s suit, the Prosecutor General Yury Chaika made a claim that the December protest actions had been financed from the abroad.  No specific evidence in support of the claim has been presented, though.

Obviously, the very idea of finding “foreign hand” at the origin of bad things appeared attractive to some Russian officials.  The head of Roscosmos, the Russian space agency, Vladimir Popovkin, attempted to present the recent failure of the unmanned Phobos-Ground probe as a result of sabotage by foreign forces.  Russian space officials later elaborated that powerful radar located at a U.S. installation in the Marshall Islands might have zapped the probe.  Eventually, however, it was concluded that the crash was likely due to “a software mistake.”

It’s easy to dismiss the Phobos-Ground story as a funny joke.  It’s more difficult to treat the same way the statement made by the chairman of the Duma Committee on Foreign Affairs, Alexei Pushkov, who suggested that the United States was keenly  interested in destabilizing Russia and would make every effort to weaken its government.  Characteristically, this was Pushkov’s first official statement in the capacity of the Duma new foreign policy tsar.

Andrei Isaev, a high-ranked United Russia party’s official, went even farther.  On Dec. 30, while congratulating compatriots with approaching New Year, Isaev told them that in 2012, they will face “new battle for the freedom and independence of Russia against attempts by the United State of America to establish control over our country.”  Isaev then assured his audience that United Russia was at the forefront of this battle.

It’s hard to believe that the image of American radars shooting down Russian space probes – or Mr. Isaev in military fatigue defending Russia’s freedom and independence – can win but a handful of “patriotic” votes switching from Zhirinovsky to Putin.  Yet, exaggerating the foreign threat to Russia’s security may deflect the voter attention from such pressing domestic issues as a widening gap between rich and poor and pervasive corruption.

But the real danger is that the “us against them” spirit will outlast the election season and begin affecting policy decisions by the future Putin administration.  To me, surrounded by “enemies” Russia looking for “stable development” doesn’t look like attractive combination.

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The Draft

Posted on January 16, 2012 by

On Thursday, Russia’s leading presidential candidate, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, launched his campaign website and used it to unveil a draft of his election program.

I find the draft being very strong document.  No, I don’t share the awe expressed by United Russia’s Boris Gryzlov who described it as “a comprehensive plan outlining…the major objectives and principles of Russia’s development.”  At the same time, I disagree with Kommersant’s Dmitry Butrin who trashed Putin’s election program for being less inspiring than Martin Luther King’s famous “I have a dream” speech.  I’d argue that Messrs. Putin and King had completely different objectives for their respective products.

In my opinion, Putin’s election program is strong because it does what any election program is supposed to do: to appeal directly to the candidate’s core electorate.  Putin’s document is attractive to the people who expect the state taking care of everything in their lives (hospitals, schools, day care centers, apartments, hot water, salaries, pensions, families, children, and their own souls); to the people who want “results,” not explanations of how these results will be achieved; to the people who’re bored with numbers and prefer instead Putin’s “action verbs:” “we will actively defend” (people’s morality from the mass media assault), “we will develop mechanisms” (of financial stimulation of the regions), “we will strengthen” (the state support of families with children), “we will bring order” (into housing and utility sector), “we will perfect” (the system of distribution of budget money), “we will guarantee” (free medical care in state hospitals).

The program confirms what we always knew or strongly suspected: Putin considers governing as a direct interaction between federal power in Moscow and ordinary citizens elsewhere.  In this arrangement, there is almost no need for regional and municipal authorities, which are barely mentioned in the document.  There is definitely no need for the Duma, political parties or civil organizations: those got no single note in the draft.

The program also confirms my long-held conviction that there is an ideological difference between Putin and President Dmitry Medvedev: whereas Medvedev thinks that Russia’s economic modernization ought to be accompanied by political reforms, Putin sees no virtue in this.  He seems to believe that modernization can be achieved solely by increasing the efficiency of the state bureaucracy.  We will strengthen, we will perfect…

It appears almost surreal, but the program doesn’t even mention the political reforms recently proposed by President Medvedev, the reforms some of which Putin, at least in public, has grudgingly accepted.

Sure, Putin knows that his “majority” sees no need in political reforms.  At the same time, he can’t afford simply ignoring the issue of reforms given the growing demand for change in the aftermath of the Dec. 4 Duma elections.

And this is where the meaning of the term “draft” apparently comes to play.  Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov insisted that Putin was still working on the final draft of the program.  The expected date of the delivery is “before Feb. 12,” which comes remarkably close to the day of the next protest action scheduled on Feb. 4.

Fully aware that his reaction to the protesters’ demands is closely monitored, Putin seems to be trying to buy some time.  Should the protest movement begin losing steam or show signs of cracks under the weight of internal squabbles – with both scenarios being highly likely – Putin will find few reasons to follow-up on the promises of his predecessor.  On the contrary, if the organizers of the protests manage to bring more people to the streets of Moscow on Feb. 4 than they did in December – a possibility that can’t be discounted, either – Putin may have no other choice as to call for further political reforms in his “updated” program.

This is a gamble.  And as with any gamble, one can win big or lose.

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