No Camping

Posted on May 11, 2012 by

The decision by the Russian President Vladimir Putin not to attend the G8 summit at Camp David has become the first surprise of his young presidency.

In a phone conversation with the summit host, U.S. President Barack Obama, Putin attributed this decision to the need to finalize cabinet appointments in the new Russian government. Had such an explanation come, say, from François Hollande, it would have sounded reasonable: until last Sunday, Hollande didn’t even know whether or not he would become president of France. In contrast, Putin had at least two months to deal with personnel issues before the G8 meeting.

While the real reason(s) for Putin’s decision are known only to him, some guesses could be made. First, Putin didn’t want his first foreign trip as president to bring him in the United States, the country he often criticizes for meddling in Russia’s domestic affairs; one would rather expect Putin traveling to Astana or Beijing. Second, Putin naturally tries to avoid the intense media attention that his appearance at the summit would have elicited – with inevitable questions from the press about protest actions accompanying the May 7 inauguration. Third, Putin sends a clear message that Russia doesn’t value its G8 membership as much as it did in the past; these days, it favors the G20 format. Fourth, planning for his long-anticipated meeting with Obama, Putin wants to deprive his American counterpart of the home advantage; Putin will feel more comfortable playing on a neutral field in Mexico during the mid-June G20 summit. Finally, Putin makes it obvious that he’s not going to invest much effort into relationship with Obama until the latter is re-elected in November.

At Camp David, Russia will be represented by Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, confirming a prediction made by the Forbes magazine that under Putin, Medvedev will play an active role in foreign affairs, including attending high-profile international events. Yet, Medvedev’s very first mission of honor has been already spoiled by the way Putin introduced it. For the past few weeks, Medvedev has been actively working on the formation of the future Cabinet. Now, it appears that it’s Putin not Medvedev who has the final word on the structure and composition of Medvedev’s government. Medvedev’s interlocutors at the summit will have a reason to treat him as a child who was sent to play in the courtyard while daddy is checking his homework. Hopefully, in the future, Putin won’t abuse Medvedev’s willingness to serve as a messenger (remember: “I will pass this information to Vladimir?”). Doing so will leave Russia underrepresented at the world forums, which may eventually hurt its national interests.

Today, Obama responded in kind by refusing to attend the APEC summit in Vladivostok, Russia, on Sep. 1-8. This news is likely to bring some relief to my relatives in Vladivostok who can’t wait until this whole APEC madness is over and they can reclaim their normal lives.

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Our Victory Day and Yours

Posted on May 8, 2012 by

(This piece originally appeared on Russia Beyond the Headlines)

As someone who moved from Russia to the United States as an adult, I know firsthand the difficulties of adapting to life in foreign country. New language, new culture, new rules of intra-personal relations, new climate and new food – all dawn upon you at once.

An intrinsic, if not fully appreciated, part of the adaptation process is getting used to a new set of holidays. This isn’t as trivial as it might seem: the order of American holidays often challenges the biological clock set up back in Russia. Additionally, the meaning of some of them is not always obvious to a newcomer. Eventually you settle, of course. First, you stop celebrating the official Russian holidays you remember from childhood: the Day of the October Revolution on November 7 and the Day of International Solidarity of Workers on May 1. In the United States, the Independence Day on July 4 becomes a proxy for both. Then you stop buying flowers for your wife on March 8 (International Women’s Day), although mandatory attendance at an expensive restaurant on Valentine’s Day may not appear to you as a sensible replacement. Over time, New Year’s Day, the most cherished holiday in Russia, turns into an extension of Christmas.  Finally, you realize that Thanksgiving, a day that you never heard of before moving to the U.S., has gradually become your favorite holiday.

There is, however, a Russian holiday that will always find place on my busy calendar.  It’s May 9 – Victory Day, the day commemorating the end of the World War II, known by Russians as the Great Patriotic War.  I belong to the first post-war generation, so my memory of the war can only be called historic, derived as it was from reading books and watching movies about this part of Russia’s tragic and glorious past. But although I have no memories of the fighting or the deprivations of the war years, I have my own memories of the annual military parades that take place every year on this day in Moscow’s Red Square. As a boy, I spent the morning sitting in front of a TV set, afraid to miss a blink. And then, there were war veterans filling the streets in the afternoon, their clothes shining with gold and silver of military decorations. They looked so old to me back then; today, I realize that many of them were younger than I am now.

These days, my 87-year-old mother helps my wife and me remember and celebrate this day. Every year on May 9, all three of us have a celebration dinner.  We eat Russian food, drink vodka and listen to my Mom’s “war stories.”  My wife and I already know all of them by heart, so that we can always add an important detail that Mom has forgotten since last time. A year ago, she reminded us how one night in February 1943, she was chased by a stranger who apparently wanted to rob her of bread stamps she just received. Without looking back or even screaming, Mom made the run of her life knowing that should she lose this race, her parents and two sisters would have no bread for the rest of the month. Before the dinner is over, Mom always tells my favorite story: how she learned that the war was over. She remembers exactly the time of the day and the street in Vladivostok she was on when she heard the radio announcement by the legendary Yuri Levitan. The weather was beautiful, of course, and, sure, she remembers the dress she wore that day.

Sometimes, we’re joined for dinner by our grown-up, perfectly American children. They are not expected to share the emotional atmosphere of the occasion; sitting around the table and politely listening to the conversation is all what is expected from them. As parents, we take pride in the fact that in contrast to many of their friends – and, I suspect, some U.S. politicians – our kids at least know that in the World War II, the United States and Russia were allies, not foes.

This year, Victory Day falls on a weekday, so our kids are unlikely to visit us.  I wish they could.  A couple of hours every year is not a high price to pay for reminding ourselves that the history of mankind doesn’t split along the country borders or generation lines.  It’s our common history.  And the victory we are to celebrate on May 9 is not only victory for us and our parents; it’s also victory for our children and their future children too.

For our Victory Day and yours! Cheers!

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Passing the baton

Posted on May 1, 2012 by

President-elect Vladimir Putin’s decision to transfer the leadership of the United Russia party to his protégé and future Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev doesn’t answer all the questions regarding Russia’s political future. Yet, it does clarify a couple of important short- and mid-term issues.

First, Medvedev isn’t going to be a “technical” prime minister in the sense Putin’s two previous heads of government, Mikhail Fradkov and Viktor Zubkov, were. To be sure, even as Chairman of United Russia, the future Prime Minister Medvedev won’t possess the same level of authority and autonomy that his mentor Putin had enjoyed in 2008-2012. Nevertheless, the combination of the two positions will definitely elevate Medvedev’s status and may help him establish himself as a bona fide second person in the state hierarchy.

Second, some analysts speculated that by offering Medvedev the prime minister position, Putin was simply fulfilling his part of the “swap” deal announced last September; some even predicted that Medvedev’s government wouldn’t last until fall and that Putin was already looking for a replacement. Putin’s decision to charge Medvedev with heading United Russia seems to put an end to this speculation. Of course, as president, Putin can fire his prime minister at any time – and the current Duma will promptly agree. Yet, getting control simultaneously over government, United Russia, and, indirectly, the Duma where United Russia has a working majority provides Medvedev with significant ammunition against his numerous foes among the elites. Far from firing Medvedev within months, the proposed arrangement rather suggests that Putin is willing to keep Medvedev for the whole presidential term. That’s perhaps what Medvedev had in mind when telling in a recent TV interview that the upcoming power configuration is “for a long haul.”

By placing his junior “tandem” partner in charge of government and Russia’s largest political party Putin has done everything at his disposal to let Medvedev become a political figure in his own right. Now, it’s up to Medvedev to prove that he can grow to the occasion.

Getting in order his relationship with United Russia will be important part of this process. In the past, Medvedev criticized the “edinorosses,” in particular, for using excessive administrative resources in the regional elections. Besides, by using liberal lingo during his own presidency, Medvedev was deliberately, if cautiously, positioning himself to the right of the left-of-center United Russia. It was therefore surprising for many to hear Medvedev’s admission – made during a meeting with the United Russia leadership – that he had never been “a liberal” and always adhered to “conservative values.”

There is nothing surprising in Medvedev’s statement. As a true “putinist,” Medvedev has long learned the art of acquiring, dropping or changing ideological “values” for the sake of political expediency. Like Putin, he doesn’t really care about United Russia’s current ideological flavor; like Putin, he considers the party as a commodity, a dispensable tool for stamping executive decisions sent to the Duma. However, given that Medvedev dreams of another presidential term, he needs a political base of his own and will certainly attempt to transform United Russia into a suitable vehicle to presidency. The party chapter – modified in 2008 to accommodate Putin’s becoming United Russia’s leader – gives its chairman essentially unlimited power, especially in the area of personnel decisions. Should the upcoming United Russia congress (scheduled for the end of the month) leave the party chapter unchanged, Medvedev will have all the means to restructure United Russia to his liking.

Putin’s inauguration on May 7 will mark the official conclusion of the “Operation Swap.” On May 8, the “Operation Successor II” will officially begin. With a track record of being a successor to Putin already – and with positions of prime minister and chairman of United Russia under his belt – Medvedev will have all the reasons to consider himself the leading candidate. It’s unlikely, however, that in 2018, simply passing the baton from Putin to a successor will be enough.

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S. 1039 (and H.R. 4405)

Posted on April 28, 2012 by

(This piece originally appeared on Russia Beyond the Headlines)

I wonder how many members of the U.S. Congress have heard of Adam Montoya. In 2009, Montoya was sentenced to a prison term for counterfeiting commercial checks and credits cards. Shortly after arriving at the Pekin, Illinois, federal penitentiary, Montoya began complaining of abdomen pain.  For nine days, he pleaded with his guards to take him to the doctor; they refused and instead gave him Tylenol. On the evening of Nov. 12, 2009, Montoya reported having trouble breathing; a prison staffer promised to get him help the next day. But next morning, Montoya was found dead in his cells. The autopsy showed that he had died of internal bleeding caused by a burst spleen. Last year, the U.S. Department of Justice denied a wrongful death and personal injury claim filed by the Montoya family.

The Montoya case is unlikely to reach Capitol Hill.  Our lawmakers have no interest in the death of an “ordinary” victim of the U.S. criminal justice system; they prefer instead high-profile cases in distant countries.  Take, for example, that of Sergei Magnitsky, a tax attorney who died under suspicious circumstances in Russian police custody on Nov. 16, 2009 (what a sad coincidence!). After having accused a number of Russian law-enforcement officials in the embezzlement of funds from the state Treasury, Magnitsky was arrested and kept in detention without trial for almost a year.  For five days prior to his death, Magnitsky had complained of worsening stomach pain, but received no medical treatment.

No American interests were damaged in the Magnitsky case, but this didn’t prevent Sen. Ben Cardin (D-Maryland) from introducing, last May, of the “Magnitsky bill” (S. 1039).  The bill would deny U.S. visas to Russian officials implicated in Magnitsky’s death and also freeze their financial assets in the United States. Last week, a similar bill (H.R. 4405) was introduced in the House of Representatives by James McGovern (D-Mass.).

Expressing concerns that the adoption of the bill would hurt U.S.-Russia relations, the Obama administration took a preventive step: last summer, the State Department composed a list of 60 individuals related to Magnitsky’s death whose entry in the U.S. would be prohibited; the administration then argued that the composed list would make S. 1039 “redundant.” In addition, the White House wrote a memo highlighting multiple shortcomings of the bill. In particular, it was argued that the criteria for placing names on the “Magnitsky list” were so ambiguous that it would set a bad precedent for how the United States deals with human rights cases around the world.

In recent weeks, the Magnitsky bill returned to the focus of congressional attention; the reason is Russia’s upcoming accession to the World Trade Organization. Discussion is underway in Congress on what to do with the Jackson-Vanik amendment, the notorious relic of the Cold War that still deprives Russia of the permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) status as a punishment for a policy restricting Jewish emigration in the 1970s.  The Obama administration wants the amendment to be lifted arguing that with Russia in the WTO, not granting it the PNTR status will hurt interests of American businesses.  While agreeing with the White House that the amendment should go, many in Congress refuse to just repeal it; they insist that something else should be put in place to hold Moscow accountable for what they habitually call “human-right abuses.”  A consensus is growing that the Magnitsky bill must be adopted first, followed by the repeal of the Jackson-Vanik amendment and granting Russia the PNTR status.

Interestingly, the Obama administration’s original opposition to S. 1039 seems to be gradually morphing into almost enthusiastic support – a change of heart driven by the Department of State and personally Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Appearing before Senate Foreign Relation Committee in February, Clinton called again for lifting the Jackson-Vanik amendment, but stressed the “need to send a clear, unmistakable message to Russia that we care deeply about rule of law in Russia.” Clinton then suggested that Cardin could work with the White House to “achieve both goals.” Recently, Cardin came up with a modified version of the bill; the new version makes it more difficult to add names to the list of human right violators the bill would create.  Incidentally, the House version of the bill, too, takes into account a number of concerns articulated in the White House’s memo of last year .

Reiterating Moscow’s known opposition to the bill, Russian Ambassador to the United States Sergey Kislyak warned Congress that passage of the bill could “impair the ability” of the United States and Russia to work together on important issues.  He also promised that there would be “significant reaction” in Russia to any attempt to link the PNTR status with the subject of human rights in Russia.  As the adoption of the Magnitsky bill looks imminent, the Kremlin should start thinking what precisely this “reaction” will be.

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Crisis management

Posted on April 19, 2012 by

A Kremlin-friendly political scientist Dmitry Orlov recently argued that “Russia had cured herself from the protest virus.” Had Orlov taken part in a literary competition, he could have won a prize in the category of wishful thinking.

The “protest virus” isn’t going anywhere; it has already become part of Russia’s social DNA. It’s the symptoms of the “infection” that are evolving: from the acute form of street protests to the chronic expression of public discontent in local elections and social media. Besides, it is spreading, moving from Moscow to the regions. There is little doubt that the episodes of the “protest fervor” that took place in Tolyatti, Yaroslavl and Astrakhan will be regularly reproduced all across the country.

So far, the regime has shown certain clumsiness in adjusting to the new reality. The first reaction was a sincere surprise at the very existence of the protest movement; that rapidly morphed into attempts to denigrate and insult the protesters.  Then the authorities decided to “match” the protest actions with a showcase of massive public support of their own.  Finally, having realized that a stronger medicine was needed, the Kremlin decided to re-adjust the tools it utilized in the past to control the political process. A new law on political party registration has been hastily adopted; a law on direct election of regional governors is next.

At the moment, the regime’s biggest headache is the situation in Astrakhan, where the “spravoross” Oleg Shein went on hunger strike after refusing to accept the results of the mayoral election, which he allegedly lost. Used to deal with people predominantly occupied with their material well-being, the Kremlin appears to be completely at loss over what to do with a fellow seemingly ready to become a modern day Jesus Christ. It might have already dawned upon the Kremlin that should something bad happen to Shein, this is likely to coincide with, or to be perilously close to, the date of Putin’s inauguration.

The Shein controversy suggests that Russia lacks mechanisms of crisis management in the public sphere.  The country’s all-powerful executive treats any concession to the citizens as a sign of weakness. The representative organs – the Duma and the regional parliaments – are representative in the name only, with the perennial falsification of election results at all levels only exacerbating the situation. The judicial system, while making progress in resolving disputes between private parties, becomes utterly impotent when it comes to protecting legal rights of the citizens – or even politicians like Shein — against the powers-that-be.  Even the Church that in many countries regularly assumes crisis management functions is considered by many Russians as yet another branch of government.

A Crisis Management Agency of sorts – that Russia seems to sorely need — could be formed based on the Public Chamber, a bizarre institution whose raison-d’être was unclear at the time of its creation in 2005 and has remained such ever since. Many Russians are unlikely to even know that the Public Chamber exists, and the majority of those who do would have trouble to explain what the Public Chamber’s role is. On the other hand, due to its low profile, the Public Chamber doesn’t carry the negative baggage associated with other state institutions.

The core of the agency could be formed by members of the Public Chamber, with a number of affiliated members – chosen, perhaps, by a popular on-line vote — added to it. Additional individuals could be incorporated ad hoc if requested by interested parties.  The rules of the engagement would have to be established, but it seems obvious that should two parties ask the agency to intervene, they must promise to accept the agency’s recommendations.

Of course, no single solution is available to solve multiple problems facing the country.  But the worst the Kremlin can do is to listen to political virologists claiming that the problems don’t ever exist.

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A spectre of liberalism

Posted on April 14, 2012 by

“Liberalism (from the Latin liberalis) is the belief in liberty and equality. Liberals espouse a wide array of views depending on their understanding of these principles, but generally liberals support ideas such as constitutionalism, liberal democracy, free and fair elections, human rights, capitalism, and the free exercise of religion.”

“Liberalism” (Wikipedia)

A high-ranked official from the United Russia party Andrei Isaev produced an anti-liberal manifesto, “What does the ideology of liberalism bring to Russia?”  (Yes, it’s that Isaev who on Dec. 30, while congratulating Russians with the approaching New Year, told them that in 2012, they will face “a new battle for the freedom and independence of Russia against attempts by the United State of America to establish control over our country.”)  Isaev is in charge of the party propaganda portfolio, so his desire to bring some ideological clarity — at the time when United Russia struggles to formulate its “ideology” – is quite understandable.

According to Isaev, the major ideological threat to Russia comes from liberalism, which, as Isaev regretfully notes, is becoming a “fashionable ideology” in the country.  Too bad, says Isaev.  It was liberals “who flooded France with blood” (that’s how Isaev interprets the historic events of the French Revolution).  It’s liberals who, while speaking of the freedom of religion, harass the Church, including as of late the Russian Orthodox Church.  And, to my great surprise, it was liberals who caused the split of Serbia and the creation of independent Kosovo.

Naturally, Isaev reserves the harshest words for the home-grown followers of liberalism:

“The major political recipe of [Russian] liberals is the return to the 90s when there were many parties, no parliamentary majorities, endless discussions going, and new Cabinets and coalitions [constantly] formed.”

What a horror! Compare that to the virtues of “social conservatism” espoused by Isaev.  Would it not be nice to have no political parties created without explicit nod from the Kremlin?  Would it not be nice for United Russia to always have the constitutional majority in the Duma (and the Duma itself being not a place for discussions)?  And would it not be nice to have the same ministers occupying their seats for years regardless of performance?  Heaven!

Quite expectedly, Isaev composed a long list of people responsible for the shameful perversion of the intrinsically conservative Russian soul; Grigory Yavlinsky, Mikhail Prokhorov, Alexey Kudrin and Igor Yurgens top the list.  Yet, I couldn’t shake off the impression that the real target of Isaev’s manifesto was none other than his fellow “edinoross” Vladimir Pligin, the chairman of the Duma committee on constitutional law.

Pligin is well-respected by the presidential administration and the Cabinet as the most prolific lawmaker of the United Russia Duma faction: for the past 12 months – even despite the distractions of the election season – Pligin has introduced 18 draft laws (compared to Isaev’s three).  Besides, he’s one of the very few people in the party leadership who does have coherent ideological views.  Recently, Pligin jumped into the ring by insisting that in order to remain relevant, United Russia must develop a solid liberal platform, morphing eventually into a right-of-center party.

As United Russia is facing unavoidable and unavoidably painful “re-branding” – with likely cadre reshuffling and even change of the formal leadership — the internal squabbles are bound to intensify.  And as it often happens in politics, fighting for the place under the sun takes shape of “ideological” debates.  It thus appears that Isaev’s anti-liberal fatwa is just one of the first salvos of the future battles.

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Disunited Russia?

Posted on April 9, 2012 by

The future of the pro-Kremlin United Russia party remains one of the major intrigues of Russia’s suddenly active political season.  To say that the party goes through difficult times would be an understatement.  In the December parliamentary elections, UR suffered a painful setback: it polled only 49% of the popular vote – and even this number is highly questionable – and lost its constitutional majority in the Duma.  More and more Russians associate UR with a witty nickname – “the party of crooks and thieves” — invented by a popular blogger Alexey Navalny.  As a result, UR candidates participating in local elections now often position themselves as independent; those who chose to run under the party banner suffered sound defeats in the mayoral elections in Tolyatti and Yaroslavl.

Still unresolved is the issue of the relationship between the party and its chairman Vladimir Putin. Despite the fact that it was UR that nominated Putin as a candidate for the March 4 presidential election, Putin never mentioned it in the course of the election campaign.  Instead, Putin ran on the platform of the All-Russia People’s Front (ARPF), a motley pool of organizations hastily created last year.  The 238-deputy UR Duma faction now includes 80 members of ARPF who seem to have no other loyalty but personally to Putin.  Rumors abound that intra-fraction relations between members of UR and ARPF are lukewarm at best; some in UR consider the ARPF deputies the fifth column of sorts.

Recently, Putin suggested that ARPF should be upgraded into a “civil movement” – a clear step in the direction of creating a bona fide political party – and agreed to lead the new movement.  At the moment, the ultimate fate of ARPF is unclear and is likely tied to the decision to be taken by the Kremlin with regards to UR.  One of the proposed scenarios implies that ARPR will become a “left-of-center” political party with Putin at the helm, whereas UR will be transformed into a “right-of-center” party headed by the outgoing president Dmitry Medvedev.  According to another, if UR performs poorly in the regional elections in October, it will be “re-branded” by being swallowed by ARPF.

Some analysts argued that UR could be split into factions, possibly along the lines of “ideological clubs” (social-conservative, liberal-conservative, liberal, and patriotic) existing within the party.  The problem with this approach is that according to the electoral law, only members of the party that retains the UR party brand will keep seats in the Duma and regional parliaments, whereas members of the newly-formed “buds” will have to give away their deputy mandates.  Given the intense competition between the clubs and individual deputies, such a civilized split is highly unlikely, if possible at all.

That’s what apparently Putin had in mind when insisting last week that the unity of the UR Duma faction “should be preserved.”  The truth is that Putin doesn’t need UR – or any other political entity, including ARPF.  What he needs is a Duma that would rapidly – and without arguing — approve legislation proposed by the presidential administration and the Cabinet.  For as long as UR is capable of keeping the Duma at the easy disposal of the executive, the party will remain Putin’s first choice.  However, should UR begin losing elections – resulting in unruly parliaments — a Plan B will come into play.

Some of the questions surrounding the future of the party won’t be answered until the next party congress scheduled for early summer.  Facing long and unnerving uncertainty, the party officials began entertaining themselves with inventing the party ideology.  (The fact that created in 2001, UR still doesn’t have established ideology doesn’t seem to bother its leaders.)  The General Council has recently approved the creation of two large ideological “platforms:” social-conservative and liberal-conservative.  These platforms are expected to function as intra-party thinks tanks that would present competing legislative initiatives to the Council.

The “edinorosses” remind me of puppets who want to start playing their parts – despite the fact that the puppet master is yet to arrive in the theater.

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